Essays on energy economics: Microeconomic and macroeconomic dimensions by Andrian, Leandro Gaston
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2010
Essays on energy economics: Microeconomic and
macroeconomic dimensions
Leandro Gaston Andrian
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd
Part of the Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andrian, Leandro Gaston, "Essays on energy economics: Microeconomic and macroeconomic dimensions" (2010). Graduate Theses
and Dissertations. 11687.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/11687
Essays on energy economics: Microeconomic and macroeconomic dimensions
by
Leandro Gaston Andria´n
A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Major: Economics
Program of Study Committee:
Pedro Marcelo Oviedo, Co-major Professor
John Miranowski, Co-major Professor
Joydeep Bhattacharya
Sergio Lence
John Schroeter
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa
2010
Copyright c© Leandro Gaston Andria´n, 2010. All rights reserved.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
WHAT CAN FISCAL POLICY DO TO CURB
THE EFFECT OF OIL SHOCKS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 The Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 Asset Markets and Resource Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 The Competitive Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 Model Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1 Sources of Dynamics and the Values of ν1 and µ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4 Oil Shocks in The Competitive Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5 A Ramsey Approach to the Optimal Taxation of Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1 The Ramsey Planner Stabilizes the Domestic Price of Oil . . . . . . . . 24
6 A Positive View of Oil Taxation as a Stabilization Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
OPTIMAL OIL-TAX RATE UNDER INCOMPLETE MARKETS:
A DIGRESSION FOR DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 30
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2 The Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
iii
3 The Competitive Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4 Model Calibration and Numerical Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5 Optimal Taxation with Incomplete Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6 Optimal Taxation with Complete Markets and Debt Managment . . . . . . . . 44
7 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.1 Sensitivity Analysis: Financial Adjustment Costs (κ2) . . . . . . . . . . 48
7.2 Sensitivity Analysis: The Tax Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7.3 Sensitivity Analysis: the oil requirement parameter ν1 . . . . . . . . . . 50
8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
ETHANOL PLANT INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY . . . . . . . 52
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.1 Characterization of the Problem and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.2 Solving the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.1 Variable costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.2 Changing functional forms of ethanol demand and corn supply . . . . . 69
5.3 Changing initial state of n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.4 The elasticity of demand for ethanol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6 Investing in small plants: the effects of subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7 conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
APPENDIX A. Tests for Unit roots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
iv
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Model Calibration: Parameters and Steady-State Value of Key Vari-
ables (Annual Frequency) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Table 2 Developed Countries - Model Calibration: Parameters and Steady-State
Value of Key Variables (Annual Frequency) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Table 3 Developing Countries - Model Calibration: Parameters and Steady-
State Value of Key Variables (Annual Frequency) . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Table 4 Incomplete Markets and Developed Countries - statistical Moments . 83
Table 5 Incomplete Markets and Developing Countries - statistical Moments . 83
Table 6 Complete vs Incomplete Markets and Developed Countries - statistical
Moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Table 7 Complete vs Incomplete Markets and Developing Countries - statistical
Moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Table 8 Sensitivity analysis - κ2 = 0.0008 - statistical Moments . . . . . . . . . 85
Table 9 Sensitivity analysis - τ I = 0.056 - statistical Moments . . . . . . . . . 85
Table 10 Sensitivity analysis - τ e = 0.77 - statistical Moments . . . . . . . . . . 86
Table 11 Sensitivity analysis - ν1 = 0.78 - statistical Moments . . . . . . . . . . 86
Table 12 Operating Costs - C0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Table 13 Baseline Case: threshold values of Yn and R(n) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Table 14 Sensitivity Analysis: Variable operating costs: Yn and R(n) . . . . . . 88
Table 15 Sensitivity Analysis: Variable entry / exit costs: Yn and R(n) . . . . . 89
Table 16 Sensitivity Analysis: Constant elasticity functions: Yn and R(n) . . . . 89
Table 17 Sensitivity Analysis: changing nss: Yn and R(n) . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
vTable 18 Sensitivity Analysis: Elasticity demand for ethanol - 1st exercise . . . . 90
Table 19 Sensitivity Analysis: Non-linear shocks: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Cross Country Responses of Growth Rates to Oil Shocks; Annual data
for the period 1960-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Figure 2 Sources of Fluctuations in the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Figure 3 Data and Model GDP’s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Figure 4 One-Time Shock to Oil in the Competitive Equilibrium without Persis-
tence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Figure 5 One-Time Shock to Oil in the Competitive Equilibrium with Persistence 96
Figure 6 Oil Tax Policies and Model Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Figure 7 IRFs Ramsey Problem under Incomplete Markets - Developed and De-
veloping Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Figure 8 IRFs Ramsey Problem for Incomplete vs Complete Markets - Developed
Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Figure 9 IRFs Ramsey Problem for Incomplete vs Complete Markets - Develop-
ing Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Figure 10 IRFs Sensitivity Analysis - κ2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Figure 11 IRFs Sensitivity Analysis - τ I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Figure 12 IRFs Sensitivity Analysis - τ e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Figure 13 IRFs Sensitivity Analysis - ν1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Figure 14 Baseline case: threshold values of Yn and R(n) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Figure 15 Rt annual average vs RE(n) and Re(n) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Figure 16 Extra Rents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Figure 17 Sensitivity Analysis: Variable operative costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
vii
Figure 18 Sensitivity Analysis: Variable entry / exit costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Figure 19 Sensitivity Analysis: Constant elasticity functions . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Figure 20 Sensitivity Analysis: Changing nss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Figure 21 Sensitivity Analysis: elasticity of demand for ethanol - 1st exercise . . 112
Figure 22 Static comparative - elasticity of demand for ethanol . . . . . . . . . . 113
Figure 23 Sensitivity Analysis: elasticity of demand for ethanol - 2st exercise . . 114
viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to those who helped me with
various aspects of conducting research and the writing of this thesis. First and foremost, Dr.
P. Marcelo Oviedo for her guidance, patience and support throughout this research and the
writing of this thesis. Words might not suffice my gratitude to him, his insights and words of
encouragement have often inspired me and make me a better professional and person.
I would also like to thank my co-major professor Dr. John Miranowski for his support,
working with him and the the opportunity of expand my knowledge horizon.
I would additionally like to thank my committee members for their efforts and contributions
to this work: Dr. Joydeep Bhattacharya, Dr. John Schroeter, and in particular, Dr. Sergio
Lence for his helpful contributions.
This thesis is dedicated to my wife Gabriela and to my daughter Renata without whose
support I would not have been able to complete this work. I would also like to thank my
family, in particular to my parents, for their loving guidance and financial assistance during
my doctoral career.
ix
ABSTRACT
The 2000’s rise in oil prices has reignited the interest of economists about the influence of
these swings on both specific good markets and macroeconomic fluctuations. In the macroe-
conomic arena, the attention of policymakers and economists has been posed the effects of oil
price swings on the economic domestic cycle. In this work, we explore a question under scrutiny
among economists and policymakers: the use of fiscal policy as an instrument to accommodate
the domestic fluctuations caused by oil price shocks. In particular, we study a floating oil-tax
rate used as an instrument to reduce the pass-through of the international price of oil into the
domestic economy. We develop two works in this topic. The first paper study a small open
economy calibrated to Chile with perfect foresight and finite horizon. This model is applied to
two types of policy: a Ramsey problem and an ad-hoc stabilization rule. For both cases, we
find that the social planner finds optimal to reduce the pass-through of oil price shocks into the
domestic economy. Also, we compute the welfare gains and losses that arise from both types of
policy compared to a competitive equilibrium economy where the government plays a passive
role. The second paper recasts the model developed in the first study. The salient features of
the new model are: uncertainty; infinite horizon; the model is calibrated to two representative
economies: developed and developing countries; and the optimal taxation policy is analyzed
considering both complete and incomplete markets for the bonds issued by the government.
We find significative differences in how the optimal oil-tax rate responds whether the economy
is calibrated to a developed country or a developing economy, or if public debt is traded in
complete or incomplete markets.
In the microeconomic field, we study the ethanol market. Aukayanagul and Miranowski
(2009) show that the price of ethanol closely follows the price of oil. Given the sharp rise of oil
xand ethanol prices in the last years a question has been under scrutiny in the ethanol market:
When is profitable to invest in an ethanol plant? In the third paper, we develop a model using
the real options approach to answer this question. We incorporate the market structure of the
ethanol industry to our model, in which entry and exit of new firms affect the ethanol gross
margin (price of ethanol plus co-product value minus purchases of corn). The solution of the
model gives threshold values of the ethanol gross margin that indicate when is optimal to both
invest in an ethanol plant and to exit the market for an active firm.
1WHAT CAN FISCAL POLICY DO TO CURB
THE EFFECT OF OIL SHOCKS?
Leandro G. Andria´n and P. Marcelo Oviedo
1 Introduction
The recent sharp rise in oil prices has reignited the interest of policymakers around the
world to find policies capable of alleviating the financial burden that skyrocketing gasoline
prices have imposed on business and households. The strength of oil shocks to cause macroe-
conomic fluctuations in U.S. was forcefully documented econometrically by Hamilton (1983)
in an influential paper that showed that all but one U.S. recessions after the World War II
were preceded by oil price hikes. Hamilton’s paper initiated an insightful debate that among
other things showed that oil shocks were commonly followed by monetary tightenings intended
to curb the inflationary pressures induced by the shocks. The debate about the destabiliza-
tion consequences of oil shocks and the optimal policy responses has rarely extended outside
the monetary policy arena and has almost exclusively referred to the U.S. economy. On the
contrary, this paper focuses on the optimal fiscal response to oil shocks in the context of an
oil-dependent, small open economy, although some of the paper’s conclusions can be spanned
to other economies.
Figure 1 documents that not only in the U.S. oil shocks are a source of macroeconomic
destabilization by showing the responses to an oil price hike of the GDP growth rates in eight
countries. These responses arise after estimating country-specific, annual versions of the VAR
model that Hamilton (2008) estimated on quarterly basis to restate the relationship between
oil shocks and macroeconomic growth in U.S.. The figure illustrates that oil shocks cause
2highly similar output responses around the globe without distinguishing between industrial
and emerging market countries.1
We focus on a particular fiscal stabilization policy that has been under scrutiny among
policymakers, namely, the management of an oil floating tax by which the fiscal authority
administers the fuel tax rates so as to prevent the full passing through of world oil-price swings
into the domestic economy. The policy has been debated in major industrial countries and
largely applied in developing countries recently; Mati (2008), for instance, reports that less
than half of a sample of 42 developing and emerging market countries fully passed through the
2007 high oil prices.2 Our main policy-evaluation question asks about the optimal degree of
pass-through of shocks to the world price of oil into an oil importing small open economy. We
find that a floating tax that prevents the full passing through of oils shocks is optimal from
the viewpoint of a “restricted” Ramsey planner. The restrictions we consider for the Ramsey
planner problem are motivated by actual fiscal policies and consist in the impossibility of
changing frequently all tax rates. Restricting the planner’s problem allows us to focus on the
optimal management of oil tax rates, which could be easier to adjust at high frequency than
income or consumption taxes.
Oil tax revenues account for a non-trivial share of total tax revenues around the world.
The average share of oil tax revenues in total fiscal revenues was equal to 5.5 percent for the
period 1988-2007 among OECD countries and as high as 11, 12, and 14 percent in Portugal,
Greece, and Korea in 1998.3 Outside the OECD, in the Chilean tax system for instance, energy
taxes accounted for 7.7 percent of fiscal revenues during the 1998-2007 period, on average, and
energy taxes represents 33 and 76 percent of the final domestic prices of diesel and gasoline.
We study the optimality of an oil-floating tax by resorting to the neoclassical growth theory
to model a small open economy where the government collects fiscal revenues by taxing income,
1Blanchard and Gali (2007) conduct a similar exercise for G7 countries and find results like ours.
2The debate in industrial countries includes the view of France president, Mr. Sarkozy, who was quoted
by the Herald Tribune (May 27, 2008) when asking: “If the barrel continues to rise, must we maintain a VAT
rate that is proportional to the price in the same conditions?”The same question was debated in the primaries
and presidential campaigns in the US during the same time and was sometimes informally referred as oil-tax
holidays.
3See Joumard (2002) who refers to environmentally-related taxes although she states that “motor fuel and
vehicle taxes account for the bulk of these [tax] revenues”.
3consumption of non-energy goods, and purchases of oil. Our departing point is a taxation
system in which constant ad-valorem oil taxes provide the government a nontrivial source
of fiscal revenues although the consumption and income taxes remain as the main sources.
As in the neoclassical theory, we assume the existence of an aggregate production function
where non-energy goods are produced from inputs of capital and labor, but departing from the
standard, we add energy as an additional input of the production process. Input and output
markets are perfectly competitive and energy goods are imported from the rest of the world.
Except for our inclusion of oil and our dealing with a nonmonetary economy, our modeling
strategy is similar to Cooley and Hansen (1992) at focusing on a finite number of periods of a
perfect-foresight economy.
Economic theory was puzzled for some time to account for the aggregate fluctuations caused
by oil shocks in a competitive model because the typical share of energy in output is about 5
percent. Kim and Loungani (1992), for instance, showed that in a standard perfect competitive,
business cycle model where oil cooperates with labor and capital through a CES production
function, oil-price shocks could explain no more than a modest fraction of the observed U.S.
business cycles. Later, Finn (2000) demonstrated that oil shocks are a meaningful source of
business cycles under perfect competition when energy is modeled as an essential input for the
utilization of capital, which in turns affects the depreciation rate.4
Because of our perfect competition assumption, we follow Finn (2000) to model the way
oil enters into the production function. One advantage of her formulation of the perfect com-
petitive model is to make the theory consistent with the idea that an increase in the price of
energy works just like a negative productivity shock, as suggested by Hall (1988, 1990), and
more recently by Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) who take a broader view and refer to the terms of
trade of an open economy.
On the household side of the economy, as in the standard theory, we assume that people
are willing to substitute between a basket of consumption of goods and leisure, both intertem-
4Before Finn’s paper, the first passage to success at formulating a theory capable of explaining the effect
of oil price shocks was advanced by Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), although they had to depart from the
assumption of perfect competition.
4porally and intratemporally. We consider that the household’s consumption basket includes
both energy and non-energy goods.
We calibrate our model to the 1996-2007 period of the Chilean economy, which is a typical
oil-importing small open economy. We set our model to adopt the observed cyclical components
of the Chilean government expenditures and we fix the model tax rates on consumption and
income equal to the average tax rates in Chile; in the competitive equilibrium, the model also
mimics the Chilean oil tax rate. The model also incorporates the dynamics of external assets
in Chile and the productivity shocks are backed out to mimic the observed dynamics of output.
Once we obtain the competitive equilibrium consistent with the evolution of the Chilean
output in the calibrated period, we investigate the pass through of changing world oil prices
into the domestic economy from two different perspectives. We first conduct a normative
analysis that appeals to the standard optimal taxation criterion in the public finance literature
to find welfare-maximizing taxes. Namely, we find the optimal oil tax rates by solving a
“restricted” Ramsey optimal taxation problem in which the planner is free to choose time
and state contingents tax rates on the household’s and firm’s purchases of oil while taking the
consumption and income tax rates as given. The advantage of this approach is that absent
any energy shock, oil tax rates would remain constant at their steady-state values. So, it is the
presence of shocks what makes the Ramsey planner to choose whether or not allow for a full
pass-through of international oil prices and to issue public debt to accommodate the changes
in fiscal revenues induced by both, the oil shocks and the oil tax policy.
For the 16-year period to which we calibrate the model, we find that the household would
be willing to give up 0.017 percent of its consumption if it were allowed to switch from a
constant oil-tax regime to a regime where the Ramsey planner sets the oil taxes. Beyond this
modest welfare gain, we find that oil taxes should be reduced by almost 0.70 percentage point
for every percentage point increase in the price of oil. The Ramsey policy delivers domestic oil
prices that are 78 percent as volatile as world oil prices and produce GDP and consumption
cycles that are less volatile than the competitive equilibrium’s cycles obtained with fixed oil
taxes.
5De-Miguel and Manzano (2006) make an ample discussion of Ramsey-optimal oil taxes
under several oil and tax settings in an infinite-horizon model in which oil enters into the
production function as suggested by Kim and Loungani (1992). They first prove and then
illustrate by using impulse-response functions that when oil is used for consumption and pro-
duction purposes and there is a sole tax on oil, oil-tax rates are different from zero. Our
model shows their results also hold when the incompleteness of the tax system arises by the
impossibility of choosing non-oil taxes. Furthermore, we quantify the optimal responses of oil
tax rates, their effects on fiscal balances, and their macroeconomic stabilization consequences
in a model where oil enters into the production function as suggested by Finn (2000).
Our second perspective to discuss the management of oil taxes in an oil importing small
open economy belongs to the terrain of the positive analysis and is motivated by the typical
stabilization role of macroeconomic policy, or more specifically, of monetary policy. In mone-
tary policy models, the role of the central bank is summarized by a loss function that penalizes
deviations of output from its trend and of inflation from a target rate.5 As inflation plays no
role in our nonmonetary model, the role of the stabilization policy should be minimizing the
output gap. But, if we consider aggregate fluctuations driven by oil shocks, minimizing the
output gap in our model is tantamount to fixing the domestic price of oil since doing so fully
smoothes out the oil-driven output swings. In other words, the policymaker can fully stabilize
output by fixing the domestic gross price of oil.
This zero pass-through policy of oil shocks reduces the household utility although the
welfare cost is minimal: the household would demand a 0.03 percent increase in the level of
consumption to voluntarily accept the allocations of the full stabilization policy. The result
leads us to think that if a stable macroeconomic environment generates gains that are not
completely captured by a representative agent model, the inefficiency caused by stable domestic
oil prices could be nil.
Oil-floating taxes have been criticized on the grounds that they promote economic ineffi-
ciency and generate excessive fiscal costs. The results of the Ramsey and zero pass-through
5The tension between these policy goals when the economy is subject to oil shocks is analyzed by Bernanke
et al. (1997).
6regimes cast doubts on the efficiency criticism. The dynamics of the model’s fiscal revenues
and stock of public debt also challenge the fiscal-cost criticism. To consider the fiscal effect
of an oil tax policy, it should be taken into consideration that the demand for oil is highly
price inelastic —around -0.05 according to cross country estimates by Cooper (2003), so oil-
tax revenues tend to increase with oil-price hikes. Therefore, it is not necessarily true that a
reduction in the tax rate in response to an oil shock leads to tumbling fiscal revenues.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our small open
economy model extended to include the utilization of oil in consumption and production and
three tax rates. We calibrate the model to the Chilean economy in Section 3 and solve for its
competitive equilibrium in Section 4. We discuss the restricted Ramsey problem in Section 5
and the positive analysis of oil taxes in Section 6. Section 7 contains some concluding remarks.
2 The Economy
We model a perfect competitive economy without uncertainty, i.e., agents have perfect
foresight. Our modeling strategy is similar to Cooley and Hansen’s (1992) although we depart
from them by modeling a nonmonetary open economy that imports oil from the rest of the
world. Furthermore, instead of specifying a stationary economy that stays in place after a
tax reform as in Cooley and Hansen, we focus on a finite horizon economy. This forces us to
specify the initial and terminal conditions of the model’s state variables but releases us from
working the stationary part that follows to the period of interest.
The economy is inhabited by infinitely many identical households that rank consumption
and work hours, ht, according to
T+1∑
t=−1
βt [ log(cˆt) + ω log(1− ht) ], (1)
where there is an endowment of time normalized to 1 to be divided between work and leisure.
Here β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and cˆt a consumption basket defined as a CES aggregator
of non-energy and energy goods, denoted as ct and eht , that takes the following form:
cˆt =
[
(ct)−η + φ(eht )
−η
]−1/η
7where (1 + η)−1 is the elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy goods and
φ > 0 is a share parameter. Hereafter, Ut denotes the time t value of the utility function
between brackets in (2) and its partial derivatives are denoted by adding the corresponding
variable to the subscript. The same notation is used below to refer to the production function
and its derivatives.
Without loss generality, there exists a single firm owned by the household that produces
non-energy goods by operating the following constant returns to scale technology:
yt = F (utkt−1, ht, zt) = A exp(zt)h1−αt (utkt−1)
α (2)
where ut is the capital utilization rate; kt−1 the aggregate stock of capital carried over from
period t− 1; zt an exogenous productivity shock equal to zero in the steady state; A a produc-
tivity scale parameter and α the share of effective capital in output. As in Greenwood et al.
(1988), the depreciation rate is an increasing, convex function of u. That is:
δ(ut) =
δ0u
δ1
t
δ1
; δ(·) ∈ (0, 1), δ0 > 0, δ1 > 1 (3)
Next, we follow Finn (2000) to link the capital utilization rate and the use of energy in pro-
duction, eyt , as follows:
eyt = kt−1a(ut), a(ut) =
ν0u
ν1
t
ν1
; ν0 > 0, ν1 > 0 (4)
Equation (5) states that the energy requirement in production increases with the capital uti-
lization rate. We can think how energy affects ut, by reexpressing (5) as:
ut =
(
eyt
kt−1
) 1
ν1
(
ν1
ν0
) 1
ν1
(5)
which permits to see that given the capital stock inherited from the previous period, there is
a one-to-one relationship between the choices of energy and capital utilization rate. If we plug
the precedent expression into the production function (3) we obtain:
A˜ exp(zt)h1−αt
[
(kt−1)
1− 1
ν1 (eyt )
1
ν1
]α
(6)
where A˜ ≡ A (ν1/ν0)
α
ν1 ; this reexpression of the production function shows that the capital
and energy shares in output are α (1− 1/ν1) and α (1/ν1), respectively. Finn (2000) uses (6) to
8show the direct effect of energy in output. She also includes and indirect effect, which operates
through capital utilization rate; given that rate, a hike in pet raises the marginal cost of using
capital; that is pet (1 + τ
e
t )a(ut), prompting further reductions in output.
Without loss of generality, we assume that it is the household and not the firm who chooses
the optimal capital utilization rate (and consequently the utilization of energy eyt ). The com-
petitive firm, in turns, faces a market rental price of effective capital rt and optimally decides
the quantity of utkt−1 to rent in every period.
The third agent in our economy is a government that provides public goods g1t and extend
transfers g2 to the household, although none of g1t and g2 is a choice variable. Non-energy
goods can be freely transformed into public goods, and the amount of public and private
non-energy goods consumed domestically come from operating the production technology and
from net purchases from the rest of world. Energy goods, however, have to be imported at
the exogenous price pet . The government collects fiscal revenues from taxing income and the
consumption of energy and non-energy goods.
2.1 Asset Markets and Resource Constraints
We assume the existence of two financial assets in our economy, (a) an international bond,
bit, traded by the household and whose price q
i
t is exogenous to the domestic economy, and (b)
a domestic bond, bgt , issued by the government, held exclusively by domestic households, and
priced at qgt . The following ad-hoc limits are imposed on the asset positions
6:
bh ≤ (bit + bgt ) ≤ b¯h, and bg ≤ bgt ≤ b¯g (7)
but we are going to design our computable analysis so that these asset limits are never bind-
ing. Consequently, the returns on public and household bonds are arbitraged and qgt = q
i
t, ∀t7.
The assumption that only the household borrows and lends abroad is made without loss of
generality. The optimal allocations of the present arrangement would also arise optimally in
6See Aiyagari et al. (2002) and Ljunqvist and Sargent (2004) for a discussion of natural and ad-hoc debt
limits.
7If the bounds were binding there would be necessary to consider the cases in which qit 6= qgt as well as cases
where bit has a shadow price different from q
i
t.
9another arrangement where both the government and the household issue bonds in interna-
tional financial markets. To see this, define bh ≡ bi+ bg as the household net asset position. If
the government wants to issue more bonds but the household is not willing to modify its net
asset position, bi should fall by the same amount bg increases, which is tantamount to saying
that the government is directly borrowing abroad.
In every period t ∈ [−1, T + 1], the household and the government must observe their
budget constraints, respectively:
It(1− τ I) + (bit−1 + bgt−1) + g2 ≥ (qitbit + qgt bgt ) + ct(1 + τ c) + (eht + eyt )pet (1 + τ et ) + it, (8)
and
Itτ
I + ctτ c + (eht + e
y
t )p
e
tτ
e
t + q
g
t b
g
t ≥ bgt−1 + g1t + g2 (9)
Here, it = (kt − kt−1)pkt denotes the household’s gross investment and It ≡ wtht + [rtut −
δ(ut)pkt ]kt−1 its taxable income. The wage rate and the rate of return of an effective unit of
capital are wt and rtut. The household takes as given the price of new capital, pkt , and this
price depends on the speed of adjustment of the aggregate capital stock Kt as follows:8
pkt = 1 +
µ
2
(Kt −Kt−1)2 + µ (Kt −Kt−1) , µ ≥ 0 (10)
We follow the standard, neoclassical small-open-economy literature at including adjustment
costs of capital to distinguish between financial and physical capital and to avoid a variability
of the investment rate that largely exceeds what is observed in practice. Notice that by setting
the adjustment cost parameter µ to zero, consumption and capital goods become homogeneous,
as in the standard closed economy version of the neoclassical model.
As for the taxation policy, τ I is the income tax rate, and τ c and τ et are the tax rates on
the consumption of non-energy and energy goods; the latter two encompass both sale and
value added taxes in actual economies. Observe that the definitions of It and it imply that
the depreciation is tax deductible. As in De-Miguel and Manzano (2006), we assume that the
government cannot secern whether oil is purchased for consumption or production purposes
and therefore has to tax all purchases at the same rate τ et . Notice that our strategy to study
8See Mendoza (2006) for the reasons to adopt this functional form.
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the taxation policies aimed at curbing the domestic impact of oil shocks fixes the income and
consumption tax rates and will consider alternative settings of the tax rate on energy goods.
Finally, the household and government budget constraints (6) and (7) imply the following
aggregate resource constraint:
F (utkt−1, ht, zt)+ bit−1 ≥ qitbit+ ct+g1t+pkt it+ δpkt kt−1+pet (eht +eyt ), t ∈ [−1, T +1]. (11)
2.2 The Competitive Equilibrium
This subsection contains definitions and a characterization of the competitive equilibrium.
Definition 1. A government fiscal policy comprises “exogenous components” on one side,
and a debt and an oil taxation policy on the other. The exogenous components of the fiscal
policy are the fixed tax rates on income and consumption τ I and τ c, the fixed transfer g2, and
the sequence of government expenditures {g1t}T+1t=−1. The sequence of oil tax rates{τ et }T+1t=−1 and
the debt positions {bgt }T+1t=−1 are the endogenous components of the fiscal policy and our object
of study.
Definition 2. A price system is a an exogenous sequence of oil and international bond
prices {pet , qit}T+1t=−1, a sequence of wage rates, rates of returns on capital and public bond prices
{wt, rt, qgt }T+1t=−1, and a sequence of the capital price {pkt }T+1t=−1.
Definition 3. Given the initial and terminal asset positions bi−2 and biT+1, the initial and
terminal stocks of capital {k−2, kT+1,K−2,KT+1}, and the exogenous variables {pet}T+1t=−1 and
{zt, qit, g1t}T+1t=−1, a feasible allocation is a sequence {ct, kt,Kt, ht, eht , eyt , ut, bit}T+1t=−1 that satisfies
the aggregate resource constraint (12).
Before defining the competitive equilibrium it is convenient to characterize the house-
hold’s and firm’s optimality conditions. The household chooses processes {ct, ht, eht , ut}T+1t=−1
and {kt, bit, bgt }Tt=−1 to maximize (2) subject to the sequence of budget constraints (6), taken
as given the price system, the fiscal policy, and the initial and terminal conditions of the capi-
tal stock and the two bonds in the economy, i.e., {k−2,K−2, bi−2, bg−2, kT+1,KT+1, biT+1, bgT+1}.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality are the budget constraint (6) holding
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with equality at t ∈ [−1, T + 1] and the following:
−Uc,t
Uh,t
=
(1 + τ c)
wt(1− τ I) , t ∈ [−1, T + 1] (12)
Uc,t
Ue,t
=
(1 + τ c)
pet (1 + τ et )
, t ∈ [−1, T + 1] (13)
pet (1 + τ
e
t )a
′(ut) =
(
1− τ I) [rt − δ′(ut)pkt ], t ∈ [−1, T + 1] (14)
Uc,tq
i
t = βUc,t+1, t ∈ [−1, T ] (15)
Uc,tq
g
t = βUc,t+1, t ∈ [−1, T ] (16)
Uc,tp
k
t = β
{
Uc,t+1
[(
1− τ I) (rt+1ut+1 − δ(ut)pkt+1)+
pkt+1 − pet+1(1 + τ et+1)a(ut+1)
]}
, t ∈ [−1, T ]
(17)
According to (13) the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure equates the
relative price of consumption in terms of labor. In (14) the marginal rate of substitution of
non-energy for energy goods equates the relative price of these goods. The marginal benefit
and marginal cost of increasing the utilization of capital are equated in equation (15); the cost
comes from the extra oil necessary to raise utilization when oil is priced at pet (1+τ
e
t ); the benefit
is the income (net of tax and depreciation) from renting an additional unit of effective capital.
Equations (16) and (17) are the standard Euler conditions for international and government
bonds, and equation (18) is the Euler equation for capital; the latter equates the loss of utility
at buying a unit of capital on the left-hand side, to the discounted utility gain at t + 1 of
owning and renting an extra unit of capital given the utilization decisions at times t and t+1,
where the capital prices are implied by the adjustment costs.
In a finite horizon problem like ours, care should be exercised at specifying the terminal
conditions. Equations (16) to (18) and the discussion that precedes them reveal that the
household does not choose any of kT+1, biT+1, and b
g
T+1. If open to choice, the household
would choose minus infinity values for the three of them. To make our problem meaningful we
force the household to start and finish with specific values of these three assets as well as to
accept specific terminal asset prices. For the stock of public debt, we force the household to
hold the terminal stock of debt the government must issue to balance its intertemporal budget
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constraint. For the other two assets, we request the household to start and finish with the
steady values of k and bi. In short, we impose the following terminal conditions:
qiT+1 b
i
T+1 = q
i
ssb
i
ss, kT+1 = kss, and q
g
T+1 = q
i
ss; (18)
in addition to the following initial conditions:
bi−2 = b
i
ss, k−2 = kss, and b
g
−2 = b
i
ss. (19)
Switching to the production side of our model, at time t ∈ [−1, T +1], the firm equates the
marginal productivity of the factors of production to their respective market prices:
Fh,t = wt, and Fuk,t = rt, (20)
and the linear homogeneity of the production function makes profits equal to zero.
Notice that under the current setting of our model, while the firm only cares about the
effective level of capital utkt−1, the household optimally chooses kt and ut separately. Beyond
this way of organizing production, we can still think about the firm’s optimal use of energy.
Denoting by Fe,t to the marginal product of oil, optimality requires setting Fe,t = pet (1 +
τ et ). Combining this with the household optimality condition (15), we obtain the following
equilibrium condition
Fe,t = pet (1 + τ
e
t ) = (1− τ I)[rt − δ′(ut)pkt ]/a′(ut), (21)
which is used in Section 5 to characterize the restricted Ramsey problem.
The competitive equilibrium of our model is defined as follows:
Definition 4. Given (a) the initial positions of the capital stock and the two bonds, (b)
the terminal positions of the stock of capital and the international bond; (c) the sequence
of oil prices, productivity shocks and price of international bonds {zt, pet , qit}T+1t=−1, and (d) the
restriction on qgT+1, a competitive equilibrium is a feasible allocation, a government fiscal policy,
and a price system such that:
i. The household maximizes (2) subject to (6) holding with equality and the initial and
terminal conditions (18) and (19); in the solution, equations (13) to (18) hold.
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ii. The firm employs the profit-maximizing allocations of efective capital (utkt−1) and labor,
that is, equations (19) hold.
iii. The representative household’s stock of capital coincides with the aggregate stock of
capital in every period, that is, kt = Kt, ∀t ∈ [−1, T + 1].
iv. The government’s budget constraint (7) holds with equality in every period. This con-
dition, along with the equality of the household budget constraint (6), implies that the
aggregate resource constraint (12) also holds with equality in every period.
v. The assets’ limits on (7) are never binding.
3 Model Calibration
We assign values to the parameters of preferences, technology, and fiscal policy so that
the model’s stationary competitive equilibrium matches key averages of the Chilean economy
at annual frequency for the period 1992-2007, when all model shocks are set to their mean
values. Except for some statistics for which we report our data sources, all other Chilean data
are annual figures from the Central Bank of Chile (CBC). The results of our calibration are
summarized in Table 1.
Our calibration strategy has five steps. The starting point is a few normalizations. Second,
we take some parameter values from the related literature. Third, we impose a set of key
macroeconomic ratios and the value of some model variables so as to mimic key Chilean
macroeconomic and fiscal data. Fourth, we use the model equations to derive the values of
some parameters. And fifth, Chilean data are used to jointly specify the model’s dynamics
and two model parameters.
The normalizations in the first step include setting the value of output (or GDP) y = 1;
given the unitary endowment of time, we set h = 0.3 to match the well known fact that
households spend around 1/3 of their time working. We also set ey = 1, leaving the price of
energy goods pe to adjust to match the Chilean use of energy-to-GDP ratio. Finally, it can be
seen from equation (10) that pk = 1 in the steady state.
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Next, we take parameter values from the related literature. Following Duval and Vogel
(2008), de Fiore et al. (2006), and Backus and Crucini (2000), the elasticity of substitution in
consumption between non-energy and energy goods is (1+ η)−1 = 0.09. As we do not have an
estimation of the Chilean eh/ey ratio, we take the U.S. ratio reported by Dhawan and Jeske
(2008) which is equal to 0.88.
The remaining calibration steps are the most cumbersome. The third starts with the
aggregate macroeconomic ratios. Our model mimics the Chilean annual average ratios to GDP
of consumption, investment, and government expenditures, which are equal to 0.63, 0.21, 0.12,
respectively, as well as the average 1992-2005 ratio k/y = 2.13. In the model, the ratio to GDP
of the expenditures on energy goods is equal to pe(eh+ ey)/y; in the data, we obtain this ratio
as the product (Me/M) × (M/GDP ), where Me and M in the first term are the U.S. dollar
values of imports of oil and total imports, and M and GDP in the second term correspond to
the value in constant, domestic currency of imports and GDP. This procedure gives a Chilean
ratio equivalent to the model’s pe(eh+ ey)/y ratio equal to 0.052. The average effective capital
share in output, α, was equal to 0.36 during the period 1996-2007. Capacity utilization, u, is
at 0.74 according to monthly data available for the period 2003-2005.
As we do not have information on the tax rates, we estimate them from data of the CBC
and the Chilean Budgeting Office (Dipres). We calculate the consumption-tax rate following
Mendoza et al. (1994) and obtain τ c = 12%. Given the homogeneity of the production function,
the steady-state value of the model’s income tax revenue-to-GDP ratio is TRI/y = τ I(1− δ(u)ky );
the data value of this ratio at 4.6% permits recovering τ I = 5.9%; we compute the Chilean
TRI/y ratio using data on income-tax revenues (TRI) and total tax revenues (TR); TRI/y =
TRI/TR × TR/y; then, the TRI/y ratio, along with the model investment i = δ(u)k, obtains
τ I = (TRI/y)/(1 − i/y) = 0.06. And the oil tax rate is estimated as follows. The Chilean
Energy Agency repots tax burdens on the final domestic price of several fuels for the period
2000-2007; these tax burdens, along with the final fuel prices, permit recovering annual averages
of implicit tax rates for several fuels. Then, using Chilean energy balance sheets, we calculate
the weights of these fuels in total consumption of energy goods; τ e = 49% is obtained as the
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weighted average of the implicit tax rates. We also use data from Dipres to compute the
ratio of government debt-to-GDP ratio, (bg/y), which is equal 0.15 on average for the period
1992-2007.
In our fourth calibration step we use the model equations in steady state and the parameter
values found in the previous three steps. Once we have the values of τ I , τ e, α, and the values
of the ratios i/y, k/y, pe(eh + ey)/y, and eh/ey, we can find the values of A, β, and the
depreciation rate δ(u). From the household’s optimality condition for k in (18), along with
the firm’s optimality condition for effective capital (19), the homogeneity of the production
function, and the optimal use of energy in equation (5), we can solve for β:
β =
{(
1− τ I) (α− i/y) + k − (1 + τ e) [pe(eh + ey)/y] (1 + eh/ey)−1} /k
Then, equation (16) implies that qi = β. The model’s steady-state investment gives δ(u) =
(i/y)k; the productivity scaling parameter is A = y/h1−α (utk)α. The normalizations of y
and ey, and the data ratios pe(eh + ey)/y and eh/ey determine the values of pe and eh. The
aggregate resource constraint (12) implies that:
bi = {1− [c+ g1 + δk + pe(eh + ey)]}/
(
qi − 1)
and obtains bi = 0.4444, while the government budget constraint (7) solves for g2 = 0.0175 as
follows:
g2 = TR− g1 + (qg − 1) bg
where TR is the tax revenue. The adopted value of g2 is approximately equal to the difference in
the data between fiscal outlays different from the expenditures included in g1 (mainly subsidies
and transfers) and non-traditional fiscal revenues (including those coming from cooper and
other taxes). Equations (13) and (14) pin down the preference parameters ω and φ.
It remains to find the values of δ0, δ1, ν0, υ1 and the capital adjustment cost parameter µ.
The values of the latter two depend on the model’s shocks and will be discussed in subsection
3.1 below. For a given value of ν1, the values of the first three are found by solving a system
of three nonlinear equations, namely equations (4) and (5) and the following:(
1− τ I) (α− δ1i/y) = (1 + τ e) [pe(eh + ey)/y] (1 + eh/ey)−1υ1
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where the latter is a reexpression of (15) that uses the properties of the production function
and functional forms of δ(u) and a(u).
The ad-hoc asset limits in (7) are bh = −b¯h = bhss − 0.2 and bg = −b¯g = bgss − 0.1, which
are arbitrarily chosen to never bind in our numerical results.
3.1 Sources of Dynamics and the Values of ν1 and µ
Our model’s sources of dynamics are the cyclical government expenditures and shocks to
the interest rate, oil-price, and productivity. The series of government expenditures, as well
as the oil and interest-rate shocks are taken from the data, while the productivity shocks are
backed out from the model to replicate the Chilean cyclical GDP.
Let xss and xt denote the steady-state and time t values of x in the model, where x
represents government expenditures, oil prices and the interest rate. From the values of the
xss’s discussed above and summarized in Table 1 we obtain xt = xss(1 + xct), where x
c
t is the
cyclical component of x in the data, defined as the deviations in logs of the corresponding
series from their corresponding HP trends.
The data sources used to derive xct are the following. Government expenditures are from the
CBC. Oil nominal prices are from the U.S. Energy Information Administration and we deflate
them with the U.S. Producer Price Index reported by the U.S. Labor Bureau of Statistics. The
implicit gross, world interest rate is (1+r∗ss) = 1/qiss. To get the shocks to this rate we first
use annual data for the period 1999-2007 to compute (1 + r∗) = (1 + rUS)(1 + ρ), where rUS
denotes the real three-month U.S. treasury bill rates (from the IMF International Financial
Statistics) deflated with the U.S. expected inflation, and ρ is the country risk as measured
by the Chilean EMBI spread. Expected inflation in period t is approximated as the simple
average of the inflation rates in period t to t − 1, as suggested by Uribe and Yue (2006) for
quarterly data. For the period 1992-1998, the Chilean EMBI spread is not available and we
approximate the Chilean interest rate with the Chilean lending rate in US dollars (from the
IMF IFS).
For a specific value of ν1; and given oil, interest and government expenditures shocks,
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we first estimate (µ; {A exp(zt)}16t=1) jointly so that we match the dynamics of the cyclical
component of the Chilean GDP and the volatility of the Chilean investment. Then, using the
µ estimated in the first step, we solve our competitive equilibrium model with just oil shocks
and adjust the value of ν1 so that oil shocks explain around 35 percent of the variability of the
cyclical component of GDP estimated by Blanchard and Gali (2007) for G7 countries. With
the new value of ν1, we repeat the procedure referred above until the values of µ and ν1 jointly
satisfy the criteria explained above, we obtain ν1 = 0.269 and µ = 0.36. This strategy makes
that the model and Chilean cyclical GDP become identical.
These sources of dynamics of our model are shown in Figure 2. Figure 3, in turns, shows the
model’s GDP in levels, and the cyclical component of GDP, which by construction, matches
the Chilean. Combining the information in the two figures, it can be seen that during the 1992-
2007 period, the Chilean government expenditures displayed low volatility and procyclicality,
increasing during the 1995-1997 boom and falling during the 2002-2003 slowdown. On the
other hand, the standard deviation of the cyclical component of oil prices is equal to 0.17,
more than 10 times higher than the standard deviation of the Chilean cyclical GDP, something
that reflects the high volatility of the oil price in recent years. Constructing annual oil prices
and shocks from average data, however, prevents seing the absolute peak prices that arise in
high-frequency data; for this reason, the 2007 value of the series does not fully capture the
recently observed hike in oil prices.
4 Oil Shocks in The Competitive Equilibrium
The government plays no active role in the competitive equilibrium of our model; it just
collects fiscal revenues from the consumption, oil, and income taxes and spends on delivering
the public goods g1t and extending the transfers g2. Whereas in the calibrated steady state,
the primary fiscal surplus is exactly equal to the interest services the government pays for
9Our calibrated value of ν1 is much lower than the 1.66 used by Finn (2000). The deterministic nature
of our model makes the indirect effect of the oil price much more powerful than in Finn’s stochastic model.
While in her model, the indirect effect depends on the persistence of the oil shocks, in our model (see equation
(15)) households know exactly the price of oil in every period and are therefore able to adjust the utilization of
capital with full response to the shocks. In our setting the elasticity of output with respect to an oil shock is
approximately equal -0.04; if we use Finn’s ν1 = 1.66 the elasticity rises to -0.18; in Kim and Loungani (1992),
ν1 → 0 and the elasticity falls to -0.01.
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its stock of public debt (equal to 15% of GDP), activating the shocks and the expenditures
gives the public debt a dynamics as the debt buffers the ensuing overall deficits and surpluses.
Consequently, the final stock of public debt depends on the sequences of shocks and government
expenditures.
As we are interested in the effects of oil shocks, we shut down all but the oil-price shocks and
solve the competitive equilibrium to study their fiscal and macroeconomic consequences. In
this equilibrium, an oil-price hike is fully passed through to the domestic economy and induces
the household to increase its ratio (ct/eht ) while lowering its consumption of both goods. The
reason why (ct/eht ) increases can be seen by reexpressing equation (14) using the CES form of
the utility function:
ct
eht
= ω
1
1+η
t , where ωt ≡
[
(1 + τ et )p
e
t
(1 + τ c)φ
]
. (22)
An increase in pet raises ωt and therefore the ratio on the left-hand side. On the other hand,
recalling that qit = β in the steady state, the Euler equation (16) indicates that the marginal
utility of consumption is constant when there are no interest-rate shocks; using (22), it can be
shown that Uc,t = ct[1 + ωt(ct/eht )]. Therefore, the increases in ωt and (ct/e
h
t ) following an oil
shock are consistent with a constant Uc,t only if ct falls. In sum, an oil shock pulls down the
consumption of all goods and affects proportionally more to the consumption of energy goods.
As for the use of oil in production, two things happen. On one side, firms seek to economize
on the use of oil by substituting it with capital and labor (the direct effect discussed earlier); on
the other hand, it becomes convenient to reduce the utilization of capital to lower its associated
requirement of oil.
The responses to an oil-price change of both, the utilization of oil and the oil-tax revenue,
defined as et ≡ eht + eft and TRet ≡ τ et petet respectively, depend on the price elasticity of the
demand for oil, ηe = (det/dpet )(p
e
t/et). When τ
e
t is constant, for η
TRe denoting the elasticity of
TRet with respect to the oil price, it is easy to see that η
TRe = (1 + ηe).10 Thus, the value of
ηe becomes crucial for determining the fiscal consequences of oil price shocks.
Using a partial-adjustment econometric model, Cooper (2003) estimates the short-run price
10If the demand for oil is infinitely inelastic, that is ηe = 0, then a 1% change in pet makes the TR
e to increase
by 1%.
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elasticity of the demand for oil in 23 countries.11 His average estimate is equal to -0.0486.
Solving our competitive model shutting all but the oil shocks and using the solution to estimate
Cooper’s econometric model obtains an elasticity equal to −0.0792. These estimations imply
that in the model, a ten-percent hike in pet leads to an approximate 9.2 percent increase in the
oil-tax revenue.12
To investigate further the effects of an oil shock in our artificial economy and to provide a
useful benchmark to understand the results of the next two sections, we solve the competitive
equilibrium with 18 periods and under two particular sequences of pet . In both sequences p
e
t
remains at its steady-state value during the first 8 years, and then jumps up one standard
deviation in the 9th year. The sequences differ in years 10 to 18. In the first one, the price of
oil returns to its steady-state value, so that pet = 0.0276 in every year but the 9th when it is
equal to 0.0323. In the second sequence, pe9 is also equal to 0.0323, but then the deviations of
pet from its steady-state value fade down according to a first-order autoregressive process with
persistence parameter equal to 0.5.
Figure 4 summarizes the responses of the competitive equilibrium of the artificial economy
to the one-time oil shock. The dynamics of the household’s variables are the simplest ones.
When oil is more expensive in the 9th year, according to (22), the household consumes less
of all goods, including energy goods. In all other periods, before and after the oil shock, the
consumption of both goods remains constant. The access to perfect capital markets allows the
household to fully stabilize Uc,t over the whole period while adjusting ct and et in year 9 as
discussed before. Finally, work hours respond in a similar way than the use of oil in production,
as discussed next.
The dynamics on the production and fiscal side of the economy are more interesting and
encompasses two types of responses. One happens in period 9 when oil is more expensive and
the direct and indirect effect of the oil price in output kick in. In that period, the use of oil eyt
11All countries in Figure 1 but Chile are included in Cooper’s sample of countries; his point estimates of the
elasticities are: U.S., -0.068; France, -0.069; Italy, -0.071; Spain, -0.087; Portugal, -0.023; New Zealand, -0.054;
and Korea, -0.094.
12The correlation between TRet and p
e
t equal to 0.99 and the value of this correlation in Chile is equal to 0.42;
here, it must be noticed that while the quantity demanded of oil in actual countries is affected by several factors,
here we are considering a version of our model where only the oil price is changing.
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is reduced at its minimum level of the 18 years. That also requires bringing the utilization of
capital to its own global minimum. And because the demand for capital is at its lowest level
in year 9, the capital stock is at its minimum as well. The existence of capital adjustment
costs and boundary constraints, however, prevents sudden adjustments in the capital stock and
explains the “v” shape of the dynamics of kt−1. The increment of an input price (oil) reduces
the optimal level of output (i.e., GDP falls) and also induces the firm to substitute capital
and labor for oil. Furthermore as, ceteris paribus, using capital becomes more expensive, firms
reduce the utilization of capital, which is the indirect effect that helps to explain the fall in eyt
and GDP in year 9.
The second type of responses of the economy to the oil shock is due to our perfect foresight
assumption and the existence of capital adjustment costs. Agents anticipate the 9th year’s
shock and prepare in advance to weather its effect. Capital is adjusted gradually starting from
period 2 and, as capital is falling, its utilization is increasing so as to avoid a large output fall
when the oil price has not changed yet. The rise in utilization is, however, less important than
the fall in the capital stock when it comes to explain the use of oil, and therefore eyt falls before
the shock. Once the oil price returns to its steady-state value in period 10, the capital stock
begins to recover slowly towards its steady-state value and so do eyt and GDP. The recovering
capital stock again becomes more important for the demand for oil than the declining capital
utilization.
On the fiscal side, as output and the use of energy in production are declining before the
shock, fiscal revenues are shrinking as well. Although the consumption tax revenue is constant,
the government collects less revenue from the income and oil taxes, specially from the latter.
Declining revenues and constant expenditures give a positive slope to the stock of public debt
during the first 8 years. At the shock year, however, public debt jumps down. The low price
elasticity of the demand for oil makes pet and TR
e
t to comove closely so that the increase in
TRe9 that follows that of p
e
t allows the government to reduce its debt.
Finally, international assets first rise because the current account surplus that follows the
fall in the use of energy and investment (notice the fall in kt−1) overcompensates the GDP
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decline. The fall in period 10 is due to a household’s portfolio re-adjustment aimed at un-
doing the increment in bg9. From period 9 on, there is a reversal in the current account that
(qualitatively) mirrors the rise in periods 1 to 8.
Figure 5 shows the dynamics of the same variables included in Figure 4 when oil shocks
display persistence. The qualitative responses are very similar to those arising in the one-time
shock discussed in the precedent paragraphs. When the economy is subject to the oil shocks
observed in the data, the responses are more difficult to track although the intuition behind
the variables’ dynamics remains unchanged. We will come back to this case in the next section
when we discuss the Ramsey planner’s management of the oil tax.
5 A Ramsey Approach to the Optimal Taxation of Oil
Here we take the viewpoint of the standard theory of public finance and formulate a re-
stricted Ramsey planner problem where the planner takes the consumption and income tax
rates as given and chooses over competitive equilibria. We assume that the government can
commit itself to follow the optimal endogenous component of its fiscal policy. We appeal to the
primal approach to optimal taxation and find the sequence of optimal oil tax rates and govern-
ment bonds that attain the maximum household welfare given the government’s expenditures
and transfers to be financed with tax revenues.
Operatively, the problem is to choose a feasible allocation that maximizes:
T∑
t=0
βt [ log(cˆt) + ω log(1− ht) ], (23)
subject to (a) an implementability constraint built from the household’s and firm’s optimality
conditions of the competitive equilibrium, (b) the initial and terminal conditions on oil taxes,
and (c) four additional constraints arising because we are dealing with an “incomplete” tax
system.
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The implementability constraint is standard (see Chari and Kehoe, 1998) and gives:
−
T∑
t=0
βt
(
ctUc,t + htUh,t + eht Ue,t
)
+
T∑
t=0
βt
Uc,t
1 + τ c
g2
+
Uc,0
1 + τ c
{
k−1[
(
1− τ I) (Fk,0u0 − δ(u0)pk0 + pk0 − Fe,0a (u0))+ bi−1 + bg−1]} (24)
− Uc,T
1 + τ c
[qiT (b
i
T + b
g
T ) + p
k
TkT ] = 0
where we use the equilibrium condition (20) at t = 0 when we write Fe,0.
If we do not restrict the choices of τ et in t = 0 and t = T , the government would choose τ
e
0
and τ eT to indirectly tax heavily the initial and final capital stock. The following constraints
prevent that behavior:
Uc,−1pk−1 = β
{
Uc,0
[(
1− τ I) (Fuk,0u0 − δ(u0)pk0)+
pk0 − Fe,0a(u0)
]}
]
(25a)
Uc,T p
k
T = β
{
Uc,T+1
[(
1− τ I) (Fuk,T+1uT+1 − δ(uT+1)pkT+1)+
pkT+1 − Fe,T+1a(uT+1)
]}
]
(25b)
where the allocations dated at t = −1 and t = T +1 are the ones belonging to the competitive
equilibrium. Constraints (25) prevent that in periods 0 and T , when the shocks are at their
steady-state values for t ∈ [−1, T+1], the oil tax rate must also take its steady-state value at t =
0 and t = T . Furthermore, to make the results of the Ramsey planner comparable with those of
the competitive equilibrium, we force the planner to have the same initial and terminal values
of k, bg, and bi as in that equilibrium, that is the boundary conditions {k−1, kT , bg−1, bgT , bi−1, biT }
that faces the Ramsey planner are the optimal allocations from the competitive equilibrium
at periods t = −1 and t = T + 1.13 This will allow us to compare two endogenous fiscal
policies whose starting and finishing conditions are the same across regimes so that when one
delivers a higher welfare than the other, all welfare gains can be attributed to the endogenous
components of the fiscal policy. It must be notice that the Ramsey problem will be solved for
t ∈ [0, T ], while the competitive equilibrium will be obtained for t ∈ [−1, T + 1], the reason is
13Operatively, we substitute these restrictions for the variables dated at 0 and T in (24).
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the inclusion of equations (25) as additional constraints in the Ramsey problem that are not
imposed to the competitive equilibrium.
As we are dealing with an incomplete tax system, we still need to impose four additional
constraints to the Ramsey problem. An incomplete tax system arises whenever for at least
one pair of goods in the economy, the government has no policy instrument to drive a wedge
between their marginal rate of substitution and the corresponding marginal rate of transfor-
mation (see Chari and Kehoe, 1998). The incompleteness of our tax system is due to the
following: a) we have two uses of oil but a sole oil tax; b) the same fixed tax rate is applied to
capital and labor in every period; c) there is a fixed tax rate on consumption. Only in presence
of a complete tax system it is possible to back out the proper tax rates so that satisfying
the implementability constraint implies satisfying the optimality conditions of the competi-
tive equilibrium. In presence of an incomplete tax system other constraints are required to
decentralize the allocations of the Ramsey problem as a competitive equilibrium.
First, we need an additional constraint because there is one oil tax and two uses of oil.
To derive this constraint we focus on the the marginal rates of substitution (technical and
in consumption) between energy and labor and their corresponding relative prices. On the
production side, it can be seen from equation (19) that firms set Fe,t/Fh,t =(1 + τ et )p
e
t/wt,
where we use (15) to obtain Fe,t. Due to the income tax distortion, the household and the firm
face different relative prices of energy to labor; in the household’s case, it can be seen from (13)
and (14) that optimality requires setting −Ue,t/Uh,t = (1+ τ et )pet/[wt(1− τ I)]. Combining the
household’s and firm’s equalizations of the marginal rates of substitutions to their respective
relative prices permits obtaining the following additional constraint to the Ramsey problem:
−Uh,t
Ue,t
=
Fh,t
Fe,t
(1− τ I) (26)
If the government were allowed to tax the two uses of oil at different rates the right-hand side
of (26) would include the ratio of the two oil tax rates, say (1+τ eyt )/(1+τ
eh
t ). In that case, (26)
would be a redundant constraint because any feasible allocation satisfying the implementability
constraint (24) would be consistent with (26) for a proper choice of the τ eyt and τ
eh
t .
14
14De-Miguel and Manzano (2006) also impose a constraint like (26) in one version of their model and they
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Second, the absence of taxes on bonds and the constancy of the income tax rate requires
imposing (16) ( repeated here for convenience) and a version of (18) in every t ∈ [0, T − 1]:15
Uc,tq
i
t = βUc,t+1, (27a)[
Uc,tp
k
t
βUc,t+1
− pkt+1 + a(ut+1)Fet+1
]
1
Fuk,t+1ut+1 − δ(ut)pkt+1
=
(
1− τ I) , (27b)
where in the second equation we use Fuk,t = rt and Fe,t = pet (1 + τ
e
t ). Finally, because our
consumption tax rate is constant we have to impose the following:
Uc,t
Uh,t
Fh,t =
1 + τ c
1− τ I (28)
where Fh,t = wt.
We are now in conditions of defining the Ramsey problem.
Definition 5. A Ramsey problem with uniform oil-tax rates and fixed income- and
consumption-tax rates, shortly referred as the restricted Ramsey problem, chooses the com-
petitive equilibrium that attains the maximum household lifetime discounted utility, i.e., it
maximizes (23) subject to (12), (24) to (28), and the initial and terminal positions on bonds
and the stock of capital of the competitive equilibrium.
5.1 The Ramsey Planner Stabilizes the Domestic Price of Oil
As common with most Ramsey-planner problems, it is difficult to track the intuition behind
the planner’s decisions from his optimality conditions. The difficulty arises because of our
dealing with distorted economies; it is known from Lancaster and Lipsey’s (1956) theory of
the second best that: “in general nothing can be said about the direction or the magnitude
of the secondary departures from optimum conditions made necessary by the original non-
fulfillment of one condition”. Dealing with a restricted planner problem makes the intuition
deduction even more difficult due to the four additional constraints of our problem. Despite
show that the optimal Ramsey allocation would lead to avoiding taxing the firm’s utilization of oil, i.e., τ
ey
t = 0,
∀t ∈ [0, T ].
15Correia (1996) considers a case where a constraint like (27a) has to be imposed because the government
cannot tax the returns on international bonds; and Chari and Kehoe (1998) consider a case where a constraint
like (27b) has to be imposed because the Ramsey planner has to choose a single τ I for all periods.
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these difficulties, we are able to compare the pass throughs of oil shocks of the competitive
equilibrium with those of the Ramsey problem.
This is done in Figure 6, which shows the dynamics of the model under three oil-tax
regimes when only the oil shocks are active; the first regime corresponds to the fixed tax rate
or full pass-through, as in the competitive equilibrium; the second corresponds to the tax rates
administered by the Ramsey planner; and the third one is the full stabilization regime or zero
pass-through to be discussed in the next section.16The top-left pane of the figure shows that
the gross price of oil, that is pet (1+ τ
e
t ), fluctuates more in the competitive equilibrium than in
the Ramsey problem. During the 16-year period where oil-shocks are allowed to deviate from
its steady-state value, the coefficient of variation of pet (1+ τ
e
t ) in the Ramsey problem is equal
0.78 percent of the value of that coefficient in the competitive equilibrium. In other words, the
planner finds it optimal to avoid a full pass-through to the domestic economy of the world oil
shocks and the domestic economy should face smoother prices of oil than what is implied by
world prices.
The top-right pane of Figure 6 shows that the planner reduces the volatility of the domestic
price of oil by setting an oil tax rate that is negatively correlated with oil shocks. To measure
the reaction of the tax to the these shocks we regress the logarithm of the tax rate on a constant
and the logarithm of the world oil price. The coefficient on the latter reveals that the optimal
elasticity of the tax to the oil shocks is equal to -0.70; that is, every percentage point increase
in the oil price in world markets should be approximately followed by a 0.70 percentage points
reduction in the domestic tax rate on oil.
The panes in the second row of Figure 6 show that the optimal management of the oil
tax stabilizes output and consumption fluctuations, a direct implication of the smoother gross
price of oil that affects household’s and firms’ decisions (see, for instance, the dynamics of
capital utilization and of oil used in production). What is more surprising is that public debt
fluctuations are smaller under the planner’s policy than under the full pass-through approach
16Operatively we solve first the competitive equilibrium for t ∈ [−1, T + 1]. Where T = 18, actual shocks on
oil prices are present in t ∈ [1, T − 1] and remain in steady state for the rest of periods. Then, the Ramsey
problem and the full stabilization regimes are solved for t ∈ [0, T ] using as initial and terminal conditions the
optimal allocations found in the competitive equilibrium for t = −1 and t = T + 1.
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of the competitive equilibrium. Thus, if a restricted Ramsey planner would have managed the
oil tax rate during the considered period, the economy would have started and finished with
the same stock of public debt as the observed ones and would have smoothed out domestic
fluctuations and the stock of public debt. The debt smoothing effect arises from the constancy
of government expenditures and the enhanced stability of the three tax bases.
The results of this section challenge the view that either implementing oil-tax holidays in
the aftermath of runaway world oil prices, or smoothing oil price fluctuations, damages the
sustainability of the fiscal policy or generates macroeconomic instability. Furthermore, since
we have solved a Ramsey problem, we also know that the household’s welfare in the floating
tax regime is not lower than what it is attainable in the competitive equilibrium. We quantify
these welfare differences in the next section.
6 A Positive View of Oil Taxation as a Stabilization Policy
Implicit in our normative analysis of oil taxation of the precedent section and justifying
its focus on a representative agent was the assumption of either the strict homogeneity of the
households or the existence of complete financial markets that makes any household hetero-
geneity irrelevant. Lucas (1987) has shown that in this context, other things equal, stabilizing
business cycles and therefore consumption does not raise significantly the welfare of the house-
hold. The Ramsey planner is therefore more concerned with the tax distortions than with the
stability of business cycles.
To a large extent, the planner’s concern contrasts with the goals of actual policymakers
who are at least as much, if not more, interested in achieving macroeconomic stability as in
minimizing tax distortions. Indeed, macroeconomic stabilization and price stability are the
two most common goals pursued by actual central banks and this viewpoint extends beyond
policymakers. Woodford (2003), for instance, observes the existence of “a fair amount of
consensus in the academic literature that a desirable monetary policy is one that achieves a low
expected value of a discounted-loss function, where the losses each period are a weighted average
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of terms quadratic in the deviation of inflation from a target rate and in some measure of output
relative to potential”. This prominent role assigned to the stabilization policy motivates the
study of optimal management of oil taxes from a positive perspective. In our nonmonetary
model the focus should be on stabilizing output fluctuations and the question is what can fiscal
policy do to stabilize an economy buffeted by oil-shocks.
Recalling that τ ess and p
e
ss are the steady-state values of the oil price and tax rate, the
government can fully neutralize the effect of oil shocks by designing tax policy such that
τ et = (1 + τ
e
ss)(p
e
ss/p
e
t ) − 1. When oil shocks are the only driving force of business cycles,
this policy of zero pass-through of oil-price shocks guarantees a full stabilization of aggregate
fluctuations, as it is shown in Figure 6. The top-right pane of the figure shows that the tax
rate should display the same qualitative responses as in the Ramsey problem but with a much
wider amplitude. Now the elasticity of τ et with respect to p
e
t is equal to -2.60, much higher in
absolute value than the Ramsey elasticity at -0.70.
While the Ramsey oil taxes were designed to match the stock of public debt of the com-
petitive equilibrium at periods 0 and T , the same matching is not possible here. The stock
of public debt will increase or decrease over time depending on the oil shocks buffeting the
economy. In the particular case of the 1992-2007 oil shocks that lead to the results in Figure
6, the stock of public debt falls over time. It is possible that under a different sequence of
shocks, and/or under a longer time horizon than ours, the stock of public debt hits any of its
bounds in (7). Although the study of this case is beyond the scope of this paper, it is possible
to think that by changing the mean tax rates we could do this case away.
If fiscal sustainability is a major concern for the oil floating tax policy, it would be interesting
to know the value of the elasticity of the tax rate with respect to the price of oil that less harms
fiscal accounts. Extending our discussion on the elasticity of tax revenues held on page 18 to
the case where τ et is variable, it is easy to see that η
TR = 1+ ηe+ ητ
e
, where ητ
e
is the policy-
determined elasticity of the oil-tax rate to the price of oil. If we consider the −0.05 average
price-elasticity of demand estimated by Cooper (2003), we can see by setting ηTR = 0 that an
oil taxation policy with ητ
e
= −0.95 would make fiscal revenues approximately constant.
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What is the efficiency cost of the zero pass-through policy? And, how worse than the
Ramsey policy it can be? To answer these questions, we resort to a finite-horizon version
of Lucas’ (1987) welfare computations and ask how the three pass-through policies of the oil
price (full pass-through, Ramsey pass-through, and zero pass-through) affect the welfare of the
household in the considered period. We define the utility function W as:
W
(
λ, {cˆt, ht}Tt=0
) ≡ T∑
t=0
βt {log[(1 + λ) cˆt] + ω log(1− ht)} ,
and use λ ∈ (−1, 1) to compute the compensations in consumptions needed to equate the
welfare of the household across the three policies. Next, we use an asterisk, a bullet, and a circle
to refer to the variables arising from the Ramsey, the full, and the zero pass-through policies,
respectively. We normalize the W of the full pass-through of the competitive equilibrium as
W • =W
(
0, {cˆ•t , h•t }Tt=0
)
, and find that the equalities
W
(
λ∗, {cˆ∗t , h∗t }Tt=0
)
=W • =W
(
λ◦, {cˆ◦t , h◦t }Tt=0
)
are satisfied for λ∗ = −0.000008 and λ◦ = 0.0004. In words, the household would demand a
0.04 percent increase in the level of consumption to voluntarily accept the allocations of the
zero pass-through policy instead of the allocations of the competitive equilibrium. On the
other hand, the household would be willing to give up 0.0008 percent of its consumption if it is
able to access to the allocations of the Ramsey policy..17 From these results we can conclude
that if there are benefits derived from macroeconomic stability that are not captured in full by
a representative-agent economy, the efficiency costs that should be paid to reach those benefits
are trivial. Certainly, the optimal policy in a tax-distorted economy requires avoiding a full
pass-through of oil shocks into the domestic economy.
7 Concluding Remarks
Since the early 1970’s, the volatility of oil prices has increased considerably and each sig-
nificant positive shock has been followed by a renewed interest in designing macroeconomic
stabilization policies capable of mitigating the effects of oil shocks. The discussions invariably
17If we consider the welfare for the 16 periods where the oil price shocks are active we have λ∗ = −0.00017
and λ◦ = 0.00027
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pore over what monetary policy can and cannot do. The reactions of monetary policy are,
however, subject to both internal and external lags and can lead to undesired recessive or
inflationary outcomes. On the contrary, we have shown in this paper that fiscal policy could
be better endowed to fight against destabilizing oil shocks: oil floating taxes could do the job.
We have shown that in a restricted Ramsey problem with fixed income and tax rates,
it is not optimal to fully passing through oil price shocks into an oil importing, small open
economy. Oil tax rates should be reduced when oil is more expensive in international markets.
This floating tax policy is perfectly consistent with fiscal sustainability. Our positive viewpoint
of oil taxes, on the other hand, indicates that by a proper adjustment of the oil tax rates, the
government could fully stabilize domestic prices and oil driven business cycles without rising
serious concerns over the fiscal consequences of the policy.
We have obtained our results with a finite horizon, non-stochastic model where the demand
for oil quickly adjusts to oil-price shocks. It is known that the short- and long-run elasticities
of oil differ significantly due to the difficulties to substitute for oil in the short run. Bodenstein
et al. (2007) incorporate these difficulties in a model where consumption, including oil, is
subject to external habits and where it is also costly to adjust the oil intensity in the production
of non-energy goods. Future research could investigate how the optimal oil taxes respond when
the model takes another dose of realism at incorporating these substitution difficulties. And
future research could also investigate how the results in this paper change in a stochastic setting
when the government has only access to non-state contingent debt as in Aiyagari et al. (2002).
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OPTIMAL OIL-TAX RATE UNDER INCOMPLETE MARKETS:
A DIGRESSION FOR DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Leandro G. Andria´n and P. Marcelo Oviedo
1 Introduction
In our previous essay, from now on Andrian and Oviedo (2009), we developed a model
for an oil importing small open economy (SOE) where a Ramsey planner accommodates the
oil-tax rate in order to reduce the pass through of the oil price swings. In that model, the
Ramsey planner finds optimal to significantly reduce the oil-tax rate when an oil price hike has
occurred. Among other results, the Ramsey planner changes in average 7 percentage points
for each 10 percentage points that the oil price varies. Also, Andrian and Oviedo (2009) found
that the welfare gains from switching from a competitive equilibrium where the government
plays a passive role (i.e. the oil-tax rate is fixed) to the Ramsey’s competitive equilibrium are
minimal, which is a typical outcome obtained in real business cycle models (RBC) (see Lucas
(1987)).
The paper of Andrian and Oviedo (2009) focused in a finite horizon problem with perfect
foresight, so the oil price shocks where known in advance for the agents of the economy and
the Ramsey planner chooses the whole sequence of tax rates from the beginning of the horizon
period. Also, the Chilean case was chosen as a typical oil importing SOE. In this paper we
introduce uncertainty and we expand the analysis in several dimensions. First, the oil price
shocks are stochastic and they are the only source of uncertainty in this economy. Second, we
study the optimal fiscal policy for two representative economies with significant differences:
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developed and developing countries1. Finally, we explore the variations in the optimal tax rate
and the dynamics of the public debt that arise when we consider a Ramsey problem under
incomplete versus complete markets for public bonds.
The size of the fiscal sector and the tax structure between developed and developing
economies differ significantly. For example, the implicit income tax-rates that we get in our
calibration section shows that capital and labor are more heavily taxed in industrial countries
than in the emerging ones. There is also a significant difference between advanced and emerg-
ing economies in terms of oil taxation; in average, the implicit tax-rates applied to gasoline
and diesel in developed countries practically doubles the observed ones in developing countries.
Thus, according to the International Fuel Prices report of 2007 and using own calculations,
we find that developed economies apply an implicit tax-rate on fuels equal to 141%, while for
developing economies this tax-rate is 77%. Our main numerical results show that the Ramsey
planner will choose to decrease the oil-tax rate around 8.4 and 7.4 percentage points (indus-
trial and emerging economies respectively) for each 10 percentage points that the price of oil
increases in the first period.
We also solve our restricted Ramsey problem with complete markets for public debt. Our
results show that this time, the social planner chooses an oil tax rate that varies in 9 and
7.7 percentage points (industrial and emerging countries respectively) for each 10 percentage
points that the oil price changes in the first period. Despite of the additional complexities
that arise in a Ramsey problem with an incomplete tax system, we are able to track some of
the economic intuition that is behind the differences between the two models (i.e. complete
and incomplete markets). Although the differences in the optimal tax rate are no as large as
they seem, we find substantial differences in the optimal debt management. The exercise of
comparing complete and incomplete markets is per se interesting; it explores, in this relative
new topic of the literature of optimal taxation, how optimal taxes respond for a particular good
when the Ramsey planner is constrained to maintain fixed the tax-rate of the other goods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our oil importing
1The terms rich, industrial and advanced will be used as synonymous of developed, while for developing the
synonymous will be emerging and poor.
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SOE model. We characterize its competitive equilibrium in Section 3 and we calibrate the
model for both developed and developing countries in Section 3. Section 5 states the restricted
Ramsey problem for incomplete markets and present our first results; and for the complete
markets case the problem and the results are shown in Section 6. The sensitivity analysis is
presented in Section 7. Section 8 contains some concluding remarks.
2 The Economy
We recast the model from Andrian and Oviedo (2009) for a small open economy with
perfect competitive markets where there is an energy good (i.e. oil) that has to be imported
at an exogenous price pe(st). Denote st = (s0, ..., st) the history of events up to including
period t, and st is a particular state of the world at time t. The probability as of time 0 of
any particular history st is denoted by pi(st). The only source of uncertainty in our model is
the price of oil, pe, that follows an AR(1) process:
log(pe(st+1)) = (1− ρ)log(pess) + log(pe(st)) + ε(st+1), (1)
where pess is the steady-state value of p
e, ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the autocorrelation coefficient, and
ε(st+1) is an error term with a normal distribution with mean zero and constant variance σ.
The economy is inhabited by infinitely many identical households that rank consumption and
work hours, h(st), according to
∑
t=0,st
βtpi(st)[ log(cˆ(st)) + ω log(1− h(st)) ], (2)
where there is an endowment of time normalized to 1 to be divided between work and
leisure. Here β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and cˆ(st) a consumption basket defined as a CES
aggregator of non-energy and energy goods, denoted as c(st) and eh(st) respectively, that takes
the following form:
cˆ(st) =
[
(c(st))−η + φ(eh(st))−η
]−1/η
where (1 + η)−1 is the elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy goods and
φ > 0 is a share parameter. Hereafter, U(st) denotes the time t and history (st) value of
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the utility function between brackets in (2) and its partial derivatives are denoted by adding
the corresponding variable to the subscript. The same notation is used below to refer to the
production function and its derivatives.
Also, there exists a single firm owned by the household that produces non-energy goods by
operating the following constant returns to scale technology:
y(st) = F (u(st)k(st−1), h(st)) = Ah(st)1−α
(
u(st)k(st−1)
)α (3)
where u(st) is the capital utilization rate; k(st−1) the aggregate stock of capital carried over
from period t − 1; A a productivity scale parameter and α the share of effective capital in
output. As in Greenwood et al. (1988), the depreciation rate is an increasing, convex function
of u. That is:
δ(u(st)) =
δ0u(st)δ1
δ1
; δ(·) ∈ (0, 1), δ0 > 0, δ1 > 1 (4)
Next, we follow Finn (2000) to link the capital utilization rate and the use of energy in pro-
duction, e(st)y, as follows:
ey(st) = k(st−1)a(u(st)), a(u(st)) =
ν0u(st)ν1
ν1
; ν0 > 0, ν1 > 0 (5)
Equation (5) states that using capital and its rate of utilization in production requires certain
amount of energy, and this use of oil in production is increasing in both factors. Without loss of
generality, we assume that it is the household and not the firm who chooses the optimal level of
investment and capital utilization rate (and consequently the utilization of energy ey(st)). The
competitive firm, in turns, faces a market rental price of effective capital rk(st) and optimally
decides the quantity of u(st)k(st−1) to rent in every period.
The third agent in our economy is a government that provides non-energy public goods g1
and extend transfers g2 to the household. The government collects fiscal revenues from taxing
income and the consumption of energy and non-energy goods.
As in De-Miguel and Manzano (2006) and Andrian and Oviedo (2009) we assume that is
the household who has access to an international bond credit market, bi(st), at an exogenous
interest rate r. While the government trades a domestic bond, bg(st), with the household, the
return that will pay a public bond issued at history st in period t+1 is a non state-contingent
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interest rate rg(st). Hence, the government commits itself at history st to pay a pre-announced
interest at period t+ 1 regardless the state of the world st+1.
In every period t and history (st), the household and the government must observe their
budget constraints, respectively:
I(st)(1− τ I) + bi(st−1)(1 + r) + bg(st−1)(1 + rg(st−1)) + g2 ≥
bi(st) + bg(st) + c(st)(1 + τ c) + (eh(st) + ey(st))pe(st)(1 + τ e(st))
+ i(st) +ACk(st) +ACbh(st),
(6)
and
I(st)τ I + c(st)τ c + (eh(st) + ey(st))pe(st)τ e(st) + bg(st) ≥
bg(st−1)(1 + rg(st−1)) + g1 + g2 +ACbg(st),
(7)
where i(st) = (k(st)−k(st−1)) denotes the household’s gross investment and I(st) ≡ w(st)h(st)
+ [rk(st)u(st) − δ(u(st))]k(st−1) its taxable income. The wage rate and the rate of return
of an effective unit of capital are w(st) and rk(st)u(st). The terms ACk(st), ACbh(st) and
ACbg(st) refer to adjustment costs in capital, private bonds and public bonds respectively,
their functional forms are given by:
ACk(st) = κ1/2(k(st)− k(st−1))2, κ1 > 0 (8)
ACbh(st) = κ2/2(bi(st)− b¯i)2, κ2 > 0 (9)
ACbg(st) = κ2/2(bg(st)− b¯g)2 (10)
where b¯i and b¯g are the steady state levels of private and public bonds, respectively. As
explained by Andrian and Oviedo (2009), the inclusion of capital adjustment costs responds to
the necessity of distinguishing between financial and physical capital and to avoid a variability
of the investment rate that largely exceeds what is observed in practice. Following Riascos and
Vegh (2003) and Espada (2006) among others, the presence of adjustment costs in international
and public bonds guarantees that the model has a stationary steady-state (see Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2003) for a detailed treatment of solving the problem of stationarity in small open
economies models).
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In addition to the their budget constraints, household and government must observe the
following no-Ponzi-game conditions:
lim
t→∞
t∏
j=0
(
1
1 + r
)bi(st+1) ≥ 0 ∀t, st, and lim
t→∞
t∏
j=0
(
1
1 + rg(sj)
)bg(st+1) ≤ 0 ∀t, st, (11)
Finally de economy as a whole is subject to the following aggregate resource constraint:
y(st) + bi(st−1)(1 + r) + k(st−1)(1− δ(u(st))) ≥
bi(st) + c(st) + (eh(st) + ey(st))pe(st) + k(st)+
ACk(st) +ACbh(st) +ACbg(st),
(12)
3 The Competitive Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the competitive equilibrium. In order to do so, we start with
the following definitions:
Definition 1. A government fiscal policy comprises “exogenous components” on one side,
and a debt and an oil taxation policy on the other. The exogenous components of the fiscal
policy are the fixed tax rates on income τ I and consumption τ c, the fixed transfer g2, the
government expenditures g1 and the sequence of pre-announced interest rate {rg(st−1)}∞t=0.
The state-contingent sequence of oil tax rates {τ e(st)}∞t=0 and the debt positions {bg(st)}∞t=0
are the endogenous components of the fiscal policy.
Definition 2. A price system is a an exogenous stochastic process of the price of oil
{pe(st)}∞t=0, an exogenous international interest rate r, and a state-contingent sequence of
wage rates, rates of returns on capital and interest rates on bg(st) {w(st), rk(st), rg(st−1)}∞t=0.
Definition 3. Given the initial financial asset positions bi(s−1) and bg(s−1), the initial
stock of capital k(s−1), and the exogenous stochastic process for the price of oil {pe(st)}∞t=0, a
state-contingent feasible allocation is a sequence {c(st), k(st), h(st), eh(st), ey(st), u(st), bi(st),
bg(st)}∞t=0 that satisfies the aggregate resource constraint (12) in every period t and history st.
Before defining the competitive equilibrium we characterize the household’s and firm’s
optimality conditions. The household chooses processes {c(st), h(st), eh(st), u(st)}∞t=0 and
{k(st), bi(st), bg(st)}∞t=0 to maximize (2) subject to the sequence of budget constraints (6),
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taken as given the price system, the fiscal policy, the initial conditions of the capital stock and
the two bonds in the economy, and the no-Ponzi-game conditions eqs (11). The necessary and
sufficient conditions for optimality are the budget constraint (6) holding with equality and the
following:
−Uc(s
t)
Uh(st)
=
(1 + τ c)
w(st)(1− τ I) (13)
Uc(st)
Ue(st)
=
(1 + τ c)
pe(st)(1 + τ e(st))
, (14)
pe(st)(1 + τ e(st))a′(ut) =
(
1− τ I) [rk(st)− δ′(u(st))], (15)
Uc(st)(1 + κ2(bi(st)− b¯i)) = βEUc(st+1)(1 + r), (16)
Uc(st) = (1 + rg(st−1))βEUc(st+1), (17)
Uc(st)(1 + κ1(k(st)− k(st−1))) = βE
{
Uc(st+1)
[(
1− τ I) (rk(st+1)u(st+1)− δ(u(st+1)))+
1 + κ1(k(st+1)− k(st))− pe(st+1)(1 + τ e(st+1))a(u(st+1))
]}
,
(18)
According to (13), the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure equates the
relative price of consumption in terms of labor. In (14) the marginal rate of substitution of
non-energy for energy goods equates the relative price of these goods. The marginal benefit
and marginal cost of increasing the utilization of capital are equated in equation (15); the cost
comes from the extra oil necessary to raise utilization when oil is priced at pe(st)(1 + τ e(st)),
and the benefit is the income (net of tax and depreciation) from renting an additional unit of
effective capital. Equations (16) and (17) are the standard Euler conditions for international
and domestic bonds respectively. It is worth to noting that arbitrage implies that 1+rg(st−1) =
(1 + r)/(1 + κ2(bi(st)− b¯i)), i.e. the gross return of a public bond is equal to the gross return
of an international bond adjusted by the effect of household’s adjustment costs on bi. Finally,
equation (18), the Euler equation for capital, equates the loss of utility at buying a unit
of capital (after the effect of capital adjustment costs) on the left-hand side to the expected
discounted utility gain at t+1 of owning and renting an extra unit of capital given the utilization
decisions at times t and t+ 1.
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Switching to the production side of our model, at time t history st, the firm equates the
marginal productivity of the factors of production to their respective market prices:
Fh(st) = w(st), and Fuk(st) = rk(st), (19)
and the linear homogeneity of the production function makes profits equal to zero.
Notice that denoting the marginal product of oil by Fe(st), optimality requires setting
Fe(st) = pe(st)(1 + τ e(st)). Combining this with the household optimality condition (15), we
obtain the following equilibrium condition:
Fe(st) = pe(st)(1 + τ e(st)) = (1− τ I)[rk(st)− δ′(u(st))]/a′(u(st)), (20)
which is used in Sections 5 and 6 to characterize the restricted Ramsey problem.
The competitive equilibrium of our model is defined as follows:
Definition 4. Given (a) the initial conditions of the capital stock and the two bonds,
and (b) the exogenous stochastic process of oil prices {pe(st)}∞t=0, a competitive equilibrium is
a state-contingent feasible allocation, a state-contingent government fiscal policy, and a price
system such that:
i. The household maximizes (2) subject to (6) holding with equality, the initial conditions
on the stock of capital and bonds, and equation (11); in the solution, equations (13) to
(18) hold.
ii. The firm employs the profit-maximizing allocations of efective capital (u(st)k(st−1)) and
labor, that is, equations (19) hold.
iii. The government’s budget constraint (7) holds with equality in every period t and state of
the world st. This condition, along with the equality of the household budget constraint
(6), implies that the aggregate resource constraint (12) also holds with equality in every
period and state of the world.
iv. The assets’ limits on (11) are never binding.
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4 Model Calibration and Numerical Method
We calibrate the model for both developing and developed countries. The economies be-
longing to each category are classified according to the income classification from the World
Development Indicators (WDI). From the energy balances of 2006 reported by the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IEA), we classified as importing oil economies those countries with more
than 90 percent of the Total Primary Energy Supply2 from crude oil and petroleum products
were imported3.
The calibration strategy is similar to the one used in Andrian and Oviedo (2009). In fact,
our criterium is to mimic annual average values observed in developed and developing countries
during the period 1990-2008 so that the model’s stationary competitive equilibrium matches
key averages of both types of economies. Except for some statistics for which we report our
data sources, all other data are annual figures from the WDI. The results of our calibration
are summarized in Tables 2 and 3.
Our calibration strategy has four steps. The starting point is a few normalizations. Second,
we take some parameter values from the related literature. Third, we impose a set of key
macroeconomic ratios and the value of some model variables so as to mimic key macroeconomic
and fiscal data from both developing and developed countries. And fourth, we use the model
equations to derive the values of some parameters.
For both economies, the normalizations in the first step include setting the value of output
(or GDP) y = 1; given the unitary endowment of time, we set h = 0.3 to match the well known
fact that households spend around 1/3 of their time working. We also set pe = 0.025. The
parameter α is equal to 0.35. In steady state we assume that the depreciation rate, δss, is
2Total Primary Energy Supply is defined as: domestic production + imports - exports - international marine
bunkers +/- stock changes.
3The selected developed countries are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong
Kong, Israel, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea Republic of, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. While the selected developing countries are:
Armenia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chile, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana,
Guatemala, Haiti,Honduras, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea Democratic People’s Repub-
lic of, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Senegal, Serbia, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania, Togo Turkey, Uruguay, Zambia and Zimbabwe
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equal to 0.1.
Next, we take parameter values from the related literature. Following Backus and Crucini
(2000), Duval and Vogel (2008), and de Fiore et al. (2006), the elasticity of substitution in
consumption between non-energy and energy goods is (1+ η)−1 = 0.09. As we do not have an
estimation for both types of countries of the eh/ey ratio, we take the U.S. ratio reported by
Dhawan and Jeske (2008) which is equal to 0.88.
The third step starts with the aggregate macroeconomic ratios. Our model mimics, in
average and for the selected countries, annual average ratios to GDP of consumption, invest-
ment, government expenditures, and public debt, which are equal to 0.25, 0.56, 0.19 and 0.61
for industrial countries, and for developing countries these average ratios are 0.22, 0.72, 0.15
and 0.53. In the model, the ratio to GDP of the expenditures on energy goods is equal to
pe(eh + ey)/y; in the data and according to U.S. Energy Information Administration, the
annual oil consumption to GDP at 2000 U.S. dollars is 0.024 and 0.045 for developed and
developing countries respectively.
As in Andrian and Oviedo (2009), we calculate the consumption-tax rate following Mendoza
et al. (1994) and obtain τ c equal to 13% and 11% for developing and developed economies,
respectively. Given the homogeneity of the production function, the steady-state value of the
model’s income tax revenue-to-GDP ratio is TRI/y = τ I(1− δ(u)ky ); the data value of this ratio
for industrial countries is 8.2% while for developing countries is 4.4%. The values of this ratio
permit recovering τ I = 11.0% and τ I = 5.6% for industrial and emerging economies. The
oil tax rate is estimated as follows. First, using the International Fuel Prices 2007 Report
we obtain for the selected countries the after-tax prices for diesel and gasoline at 2006 U.S.
dollars, we define these prices as the domestic price and equal to ped = p
e(1 + τ e). Second in
order to obtain the prices of both fuels net of taxes (pe), we take the U.S. prices of gasoline
and diesel and we subtract the federal and state taxes (available in the Tax Foundation). And
third, we obtain the oil-tax rate for each country as τ e = ped/p
e−1. Averaging across countries
and fuels we have that τ e is equal to 141% and 77% for developed and developing countries,
respectively. The parameters that govern the rate of growth of pe (equation (1)) were obtained
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as the autocorrelation (ρ = 0.73) and standard deviation (σ = 0.013) of the HP filter cycle for
the annual period 1990-2008 of the price of oil deflated by the U.S. CPI.
In our fourth calibration step we use the model equations in steady state and the parameter
values found in the previous three steps. In steady-state we have that i = δ(u)k, using the ratio
i/y, and δss = 0.1 we get that k is equal to 2.53 and 2.22 for industrial and emerging countries
respectively. Once we have the values of τ I , τ e, α, and the values of the ratios i/y, k/y,
pe(eh+ ey)/y, and eh/ey, we can find the values of A, and β. From the household’s optimality
condition for k in (18), along with the firm’s optimality condition for effective capital (19), the
homogeneity of the production function, and the optimal use of energy in equation (5), we can
solve for β:
β =
{(
1− τ I) (α− i/y) + k − (1 + τ e) [pe(eh + ey)/y] (1 + eh/ey)−1} /k
The value of β is 0.98 for developed and 0.97 for developing economies4. Then, equations
(16) and (17) imply that r = 1/β − 1 = rg. The productivity scaling parameter is A =
y/h1−α (utk)α. The normalizations of y and pe, and the data ratios pe(eh + ey)/y and eh/ey
determine the values of ey and eh. The aggregate resource constraint (12) implies that:
bi = {1− [c+ g1 + δk + pe(eh + ey)]}/ (r)
and obtains bi = 1.20 and bi = 3.99 for developed and developing economies respectively, while
the government budget constraint (7) solves for g2 = −0.011 and g2 = −0.019 as follows:
g2 = TR− g1 − rbg
where TR is the tax revenue from consumption, income and oil purchases. Equations (13) and
(14) pin down the preference parameters ω and φ.
In order to find the values of δ0, δ1, ν0 and ν1 we follow Finn (2000). There are two main
steps to the solution here. First we solve for δ1 and ν1. Noting the properties of the production,
δ and a functions, equation (15) in steady state can be written as:
pe(1 + τ e)ν1ak = (1− τ I)(α− δ1δssk) (21)
4The values of the discount factor is consistent with the common view that emerging economies care less the
future (see Mendoza (2006) for a detailed explanation).
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Let us rewrite the functions δ and a as:
δ = uˆδ1/δ1 (22)
a = uˆν1/ν1 (23)
where uˆ is a scalar (denoted by m) of u. Since we know the values of ak and δssk, equations
(21) - (23) form a system of three nonlinear equations in the three unknowns: δ1, ν1 and uˆ.
The value for δ1 is equal to 1.25 and 1.42 for industrial and emerging markets. While the value
of ν1 is 0.98 and 0.78. In the second step we obtain δ0, ν0, noting that
δ0u
δ1/δ1 = uˆδ1/δ1 (24)
ν0u
ν1/ν1 = uˆν1/ν1 (25)
m = uˆ/u (26)
These last three equations may be solved to find m (not of importance), δ0 and ν0. The
values of δ0 are 0.17 and 0.20 for developed and developing countries; and the values of ν0 are
0.24 and 0.40. It remains to determine the values of the capital and bonds adjustment cost
parameters, κ1 and κ2. These two parameters are set according to the literature. Thus, we set
κ1 = 0.028 as in Mendoza (1991) and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003); and κ2 = 0.1 (close to
the value of Riascos and Vegh (2003)). Regarding the value of the last parameter a sensitivity
analysis will be conducted.
Finally, as in Riascos and Vegh (2003) and Espada (2006), once we have a recursive repre-
sentation of the models (one for industrial countries and one for emerging countries), we are
going to linearize them around their non-stochastic stationary steady states. Then, we will
analyze the dynamic properties of such models using some statistics and the impulse response
functions of the endogenous variables (measured as percent deviations from their steady state
values) when a shock has occurred in period t = 0.
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5 Optimal Taxation with Incomplete Markets
In this optimal taxation problem, the government chooses state-contingent feasible alloca-
tions that can be implementable as a competitive equilibrium. Formally, this Ramsey problem
consists in maximizing (2) subject to (6), (7), (13) to (19), taking as given the initial conditions
and the no-Ponzi-game conditions (11).
This restricted Ramsey problem has a non-recursive structure since decision rules will de-
pend not only on the current state but also on future information based on agents’ decision
rules. This is because the imposition of equations (16) and (18) makes that the current allo-
cations depend on plans for future variables5. Following Riascos and Vegh (2003) and Espada
(2006) for the case of a SOE, we write the government’s problem in a recursive framework by
using the recursive contracts approach of Marcet and Marimon (1994), also used in Aiyagari
et al. (2002) for optimal taxation with incomplete markets for a closed economy. In a non-
recursive notation we have that the objective function of the Ramsey planner can be written
as:
∑
t=0,st
βtpi(st){U(c(st), eh(st), h(st))
+ µ1(st)[Uc(st)− βEtUc(st+1)R˜(st+1)]
+ µ2(st)[Uc(st)− βEtUc(st+1)Rk(st+1)]}
(27)
subject to (6), (7), (13) to (15), the initial conditions and (11). Where R˜t+1 = (1+ r)/(1+
κ2(bi(st)−b¯i)) and Rk(st) = [(1−τ I)(rk(st)u(st)−δ(u(st)))+1+κ1(k(st)−k(st−1))−pe(st)(1+
τ e(st))a(u(st))]/(1 + κ1(k(st) − k(st−1))). Using the law of iterated expectations, we can
transform the government’s objective function (27) to the following equivalent representation:
∑
t=0,st
βtpi(st){U(c(st), eh(st), h(st)) + Uc(st)/(1 + τ c)(γ1(st) + γ2(st))} (28)
µ1(st) = R˜t(st)µ1(st−1) + γ1(st), µ1(s−1) = 0 (29)
5Equation (16) is the essence of the non-recursive nature of the Ramsey problem (see Aiyagari et al. (2002)
for more detail). However, in our particular case, a fixed income-tax rate on capital imposes equation (18) as
an additional constraint that generates an identical problem of non-recursion as the Euler for bonds.
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µ2(st) = Rk(st)µ2(st−1) + γ2(st), µ2(s−1) = 0 (30)
Notice that this problem does not have any future variables in the constraints and that
all the functions in the constraints are known. Moreover, the solution to the original Ramsey
problem must also be a solution to the problem of maximizing (28) subject to (6), (7), (13) -
(15), (29) - (30), and taking as given the initial conditions and (11).
Once the problem is linearized around its steady state, we get the impulse response func-
tions (IRF) and some variables’ statistics. This framework allows us to describe the dynamics
of the economy when the social planner adjusts period by period the oil-tax rate and the stock
of public debt after an oil price hike has taken place. Starting with the first numerical exercise,
figure 7 shows the dynamics of the optimal solution to this Ramsey problem using the IRF to
a 1 percent increment in pe6 for both industrial and emerging countries; and tables 4 and 5
exhibit statistical moments for selected variables. These results are in line with ones of Andrian
and Oviedo (2009). Comparing the response of the oil tax rate, we observe that if the price
of oil increases 10%, the Ramsey planner finds optimal to decrease τ e, at t = 07. in 8.41%
and 7.44% for developed and developing countries, respectively; that is, τ e falls 12 and 5.5
percentage points for advanced and emerging economies, respectively. Given the large degree
of pass through of oil price shocks that it is allowed in emerging economies, the allocations
of such countries exhibit larger variability than the ones observed in industrial countries (see
tables 4 and 5). Thus, at 1% increment in pe, GDP decreases a 0.05% for developing countries,
while in developed countries output falls 0.04%. Consumption of non-energy goods, c, dis-
plays a variation of -0.02% and -0.03% for developed and developing economies, respectively.
Productive variables -such as rate of utilization of capital, stock of capital, and use of oil in pro-
duction (ey)- also fall with a higher drop in developing countries than in developed countries.
Thus, u falls 0.075% and 0.088%, k(st) decreases 0.014% and 0.03%, and ey display percentage
variations of -0.073% and -0.069% for developing and industrial economies respectively.
The behavior of the financial assets displays the other side of the coin regarding real allo-
cations. Thus, the drop of tax revenues from income and consumption are overcompensated
6Unless is strictly necessary we drop the time history (st) from the variables
7All comparisons will be made at the moment that the shock in pe occurs, i.e. in t = 0.
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by the climb of oil tax revenue, which it turns out in a rise of total tax revenues and a fall of
the stock of public debt. However, the ratio public debt to GDP, bg(st)/GDP (st), increases
0.044% and 0.047% for rich and developing economies; that is because the fall in GDP is higher
than the improvement registered in the stock of debt. Also, the household’s international net
asset position as percentage of GDP, bi(st)/GDP (st), displays an increment due to a current
account surplus. This results from an improvement in the trade balance explained by a fall in
both the domestic absorption (c+ g + i+ ACk + ACbh + ACbg) and oil imports (pe(eh + ey))
that overcompensate the drop in the GDP. The percentage increment for bi(st)/GDP (st) is
0.05% and 0.06% for developed and developing countries respectively.
Also, from tables 4 and 5 we observe several interesting results. First, as explained be-
fore, the optimal oil-tax rate for rich countries displays a higher volatility than for emerging
countries. As a result of a higher pass trough that the Ramsey planner allows in developing
economies, the optimal allocations (GDP, c, ey, u, k, bi, bg) exhibit a higher degree of variability
compared to developed economies. Second, it is notable the large degree of correlation between
real allocations and price of oil. Again, the higher response of τ e in rich countries implies that
the correlations between the allocations are lower than in poor countries.
It remains to answer what elements explain the difference in the optimal tax policies be-
tween both type of countries. We are going to try to develop an answer in sections 6 and
7, when we introduce an additional analysis in debt management and we conduct sensitivity
analysis of some parameters and variables.
6 Optimal Taxation with Complete Markets and Debt Managment
There are several ways in which we can introduce complete markets for public bonds in our
model. Complete markets can be modeled with a state-contingent interest rate (say Rb(st))
and a single bond (Chari et al. (1994) for a closed economy and De-Miguel and Manzano
(2006) for SOE). Another alternative is by using state-contingent bonds (bg(st+1|st)) that
have to be bought at prices q(st+1|st) (Aiyagari et al. (2002)). Besides, either the whole set
of financial assets (private and public bonds) or just the bonds issued by the public sector can
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be traded in complete markets8. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003), in a model without public
sector, ”close” a SOE with complete markets using state-contingent bonds because the shock
affecting the economy is domestic (i.e. a productivity shock). Therefore, under the assumption
of small economy, the household can completely hedge the domestic fluctuations by issuing the
right amount of state-contingent bonds for each state of the world. This fact implies that
the marginal utility of consumption is constant across states and time, ”closing” the small
open economy. Using this approach Riascos and Vegh (2003) arrive at the same outcome of a
constant marginal utility of consumption as Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) for an optimal
taxation problem with complete markets for a small open endowment economy. In Riascos and
Vegh (2003), the shocks are of a domestic nature and there is only one consumption-tax rate.
In our case, the oil price shock is a foreign type. The empirical evidence shows that oil price
hikes affect negatively the whole world (or at least a non trivial number of countries) as recently
documented by Blanchard and Gali (2007) and Hamilton (2008), among others9. Therefore,
domestic economies cannot completely hedge from the oil price swings. In consequence, we
follow De-Miguel and Manzano (2006) and we assume that only the government can issue
bonds with a state-contingent return.
We introduce a complete markets environment following Chari et al. (1994) for a closed
economy and De-Miguel and Manzano (2006) for a SOE. In particular, the government is
allowed to pay a state-contingent return of bonds, rg(st), over the debt issued in the precedent
period, bg(st−1). Hence, the household’s and government’s budget constraints are modified as
follows10:
I(st)(1− τ I) + bi(st−1)(1 + r) + bg(st−1)(1 + rg(st)) + g2 ≥
bi(st) + bg(st) + c(st)(1 + τ c) + (eh(st) + ey(st))pe(st)(1 + τ e(st))
+ i(st) +ACk(st) +ACbh(st),
(31)
8An interesting work is the one of Angyridis (2007), where he model a SOE with complete markets in
international bonds and a public domestic bond that is issued in incomplete markets
9see Andrian and Oviedo (2009) for a detailed review of this literature
10Although convergence is ensured in public bonds due to the complete markets environment, we kept positive
adjustment costs, ACbg(s
t), so the results of this model can be fully compared with the ones of incomplete
markets.
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and
I(st)τ I + c(st)τ c + (eh(st) + ey(st))pe(st)τ e(st)
+ bg(st) ≥ bg(st−1)(1 + rg(st)) + g1 + g2 +ACbg(st)
(32)
The first order condition for public bonds becomes11:
Uc(st) = βEUc(st+1)(1 + rg(st+1)), (33)
In this complete markets environment, the Ramsey planner maximizes equation (2) subject
to the households’s optimality conditions (equations (13) to (16)), equation (18) and equation
(33), the firm’s optimality conditions (equation (19)), the agents’ budget constraints (equations
(31) and (32)), the initial conditions in the stock of the two bonds and capital, and equation
(11).
Figures 8 (industrial countries) and 9 (emerging countries) compare the IRFs of selected
variables for incomplete versus complete markets. For both types of economies, there are
remarkable differences between the adjustment path that displays both types of models. In
fact, the initial percent deviation of τ e respect its steady state is, in absolute values, higher in
the complete markets case than the incomplete markets case (0.04 and 0.03 percentage points
for developed and developing countries, respectively). That is, for each 10 percent increment
in the price of oil, oil-tax rate falls 8.9 and 7.7 percent for developed and developing countries,
respectively; This higher response of the oil-tax rate to a hike in the oil price for complete
markets shows that real allocations, such as GDP and the ratio c/eh, depict a smoother
path trough their steady state values. In this way, we observe that the volatility of GDP,
consumption on non-energy goods and the ratio c/eh are lower in complete markets compared
to incomplete markets (see tables 6 and 7).
Another main difference between complete markets (CM) and incomplete markets (IM)
relies in the public sector, in particular the public debt management. Using figures 8 and 9
and tables 6 and 7, we observe that while the primary surplus shows a deeper fall in CM -due
to a higher drop in oil tax revenues compared to IM- the percentage variation in the total
11note the slightly difference between complete and incomplete markets, in the case under analysis the gov-
ernment can choose at period t and history st the interest rate rg(st)
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surplus in the first period is positive. In fact, under CM the government ”partially defaults”
the interest payments in t = 0 (rg decreases 0.0125 and 0.006 percentage points for developed
and developing countries, respectively). The later allows the government not only to reduce
more the pass through of oil price shocks (first pane in pictures 8 and 9) into the domestic
economy in CM compared to IM (i.e. the response of τ e in CM is bigger than IM), but also
to generate an overall public surplus. After the first period, the dynamics of the public sector
show that public debt increases again, but at a lower rate than in incomplete markets. The
paths of bg/GDP displayed in figures 8 and 9 may result inconsistent to the reader after the last
explanations, but are in line with the aforementioned in the IM section. Thus, the percentage
increment in this ratio obeys to the fact that GDP is falling at a higher rate than bg in the
first period. Then, when public debt increases, it does it at a higher rate than the recovery of
output. Finally, both the variability and the autocorrelation displayed by the primary surplus
and government debt are lower in CM.
7 Sensitivity Analysis
In this Section we conduct sensitivity analysis to evaluate how public debt and the optimal
oil-tax rate respond when we vary some key steady-state variables and parameters. Primarily,
the objective of this Section is to evaluate what parameters explain the wedge in the optimal
fiscal policy between developed and developing countries. Therefore, only the parameters that
have shown significant changes between the two country’s models are shown. In particular we
analyze some of the factors that affect the government’s budget constraint, the adjustment
cost on debt, and the tax structure. In order to simplify we use the developed economy with
incomplete markets as the benchmark model. As it is common with most restricted Ramsey-
planner problems, it is difficult to track the intuition behind the planner’s decisions from his
optimality conditions. Despite this fact, we are able to compare the pass through of oil shocks
into the domestic economy of the different sensitivity analysis exercises with the one of the
baseline case.
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7.1 Sensitivity Analysis: Financial Adjustment Costs (κ2)
What is the effect of the presence of adjustment costs in the optimal fiscal policy? How does
debt management change if adjustment costs is much lower than the baseline case? Thus, our
first experiment consists on modifying the financial adjustment cost parameter. We compare
the benchmark case, where κ2 = 0.1, with a smaller value of this parameter, κ2 = 0.0008,
which is closer to the values used by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) and Espada (2006).
Figure 10 displays the IRFs to 1 percentage increase in the price of oil. There is a monotonic
relationship between oil-tax rate and κ2; as the value of this parameter decreases, the optimal
response of τ e increases with the value of κ2 (at t = 0 we have that τ e falls 0.88% and 0.84%
when κ2 is equal to 0.0008 and 0.1 respectively).
Since the government smoothes distortions over time, a lower bond’s adjustment cost allows
the government to divert resources that instead of being used in adjustment costs are used in
supporting a higher loss in oil-tax revenue (i.e. via reduction of τ e). This additional drop of
tax revenues is financed with a greater level of public debt compared to the benchmark case.
Looking at tables 4 and 8 we note that real allocations display less variability when financial
adjustment costs are almost nil. Moreover, given the functional form of ACbg(st), with a small
value of κ2 (i.e. small adjustment costs), the Ramsey planner is capable of rollover large levels
of debt in every period.
There is a particular feature across the adjustment path of real allocations: even though
the IRFs with κ2 = 0.0008 display a smoother pattern than the IRFs with κ2 = 0.1, they tend
to cross each other. This phenomenon is explained by two effects that low adjustment costs
has on the optimal fiscal policy. First, as we state before, time series tend to be smoother
for small κ2 explained by low degree of pass through of oil price shocks and less variability of
marginal utility of consumption across time. Second, a low value of κ2 enables the government
to rollover an amount of debt different than the steady state value at a lower cost. Therefore,
marginal utility of consumption tends to be different from its steady state value for a longer
period of time compared to the benchmark case. Thus, we have lower variability but higher
persistence in the adjustment paths.
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7.2 Sensitivity Analysis: The Tax Structure
In this section we modify one by one the tax rates on income and oil12 (τ I and τ e), so
we can explore the effects of each tax-rate in the optimal response of the Ramsey planner to
changes in the price of oil. It is worth to noting that by modifying some of these parameters
will vary the steady state value of other parameters and endogenous variables.
7.2.1 Income-Tax rate (τ I)
We reduce τ I from its baseline value to the one reported for developing economies. Figure 11
shows the IRFs for selected variables. A decrement in τ I does not produce significant changes
of the optimal response of τ e to shocks in the oil price. In fact, compared to the benchmark
case, the percentage deviation of τ e is 0.01 percentage points smaller (in absolute values) in the
first period. Neither GDP nor consumption of non-energy goods evidence significant responses
to change made in τ I13.
The production factors display almost imperceptible variations compared to the benchmark
case. However, these changes follow the expected direction, ceteris paribus a small income tax-
rate increases the rate of wage and the rate of return of effective capital. Therefore, GDP and
productive factors decrease less to an oil price shock in this exercise than in the benchmark
case. Figure 11 shows that the paths of these variables for a small τ I are always above than
the ones in the baseline case.
7.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis: Oil-Tax Rate (τ e)
In this exercise, we reduce the steady state value of τ e from 1.41 to 0.77. Figure 12 displays
the IRFs for selected variables to 1 percent increment in pe. We have that changing the steady
state value of the oil-tax rate generate some differences between the benchmark case and the
modified one. In fact, the IRF for τ e displays a lower response compared to the baseline case
(0.08 percentage points). This change in the optimal response of the Ramsey planner to hikes
in the price of oil is remarkable similar to the results of Section 5 when the cases for industrial
12The consumption-tax rate, τ c, is not analyzed because it is very similar in both type of countries
13given the similarity of both type of models, we do not report the table of statistics.
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versus emerging economies were studied. However, the adjustment paths of this economy to
its steady state are different from the ones for emerging economies. In fact, the variables in
this exercise trend to closely follow the behavior of the benchmark case. Also, tables 5 and 10
show that the variability of the real allocations is lower in this case than the benchmark case,
given the higher response of τ e at period 0.
7.3 Sensitivity Analysis: the oil requirement parameter ν1
The last exercise consists on modifying the value of the parameter that affects the require-
ments of oil in production, ey. Thus, we reduce the value of ν1 from 0.98 (baseline case) to
0.78 (developing countries case). Here, the numerical solution shows that the optimal response
of τ e decreases in absolute value from -0.84% to -0.81%. As explained before, the higher pass
through allowed in the modified case is reflected in higher variations in real allocations, such
as consumption, GDP, capital, and rate of utilization of capital (see figure 13). However, the
variability displayed in this case is smaller compared to the benchmark case (see table 11).
Looking at the results of Section 7.2.2, we can intuitively note that the effects of ν1 and the
steady state value of τ e complement each other in reproducing the dynamics of the benchmark
case. On one hand, while reducing the value of τ e (keeping ν1 at the baseline value) changes the
optimal response of itself to the levels observed in developing economies, does not significantly
modify the adjustment paths of the rest of the variables in the the model. On the other hand,
a change in ν1 (keeping τ e at the baseline value) produces a lower response of the oil-tax
rate, but the trajectories of the variables are markedly affected. Thus, we observe that the
differences between developed and developing economies can be explained in some degree by
differences observed in ν1 and τ e.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we extend the analysis made in Andrian and Oviedo (2009). In particular,
we introduce uncertainty in the oil price shocks and we study the optimal fiscal policies under
complete and incomplete markets for public debt. We have motivated our analysis wondering
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how the Ramsey planner responds to an oil price hike when the economy was either a developed
or a developing country. We have centered this study on three facts. First, how the optimal
policy rules vary from industrial to emerging economies; second, what model’s parameter may
help to explain such differences; and third, how the solutions for a Ramsey problem differ for
complete and incomplete markets.
We found that the social planner in a developed country decrease the oil-tax rate by 8.5%
for every 10% oil price hike, while for a developing country the optimal response is 7.4%.
Another finding shows that the differences between incomplete and complete markets were
not as significant as we expected. However, the exercise was per se interesting. By taking
advantage of the possibility of ”partially” default its debt and lowering in a higher degree the
oil tax-rate, the Ramsey planner in a complete markets environment decreases more the pass
through of oil price shocks than the planner in incomplete markets.
Future research could investigate how oil should be taxed in a less restrictive Ramsey
problem. That is, the model should be expanded so the social planner have the possibility
of modifying more than one tax rate levied on other goods (De-Miguel and Manzano (2006))
with an incomplete markets environment for public debt.
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ETHANOL PLANT INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Leandro G. Andria´n and John Miranowski
1 Introduction
Before 2005, most dry-mill ethanol plant investments were made to support up to 50 million
gallons per year (MGY) capacity operations. Many of these plants were financed by local
investors, who presumably were interested in capturing higher returns on their corn, land,
businesses, and adding value and jobs to the local community. After 2005 and 2006, an
economic evolution occurred in the ethanol industry, with characteristics including: increasing
plant size, increasing output per worker, and ultimately, decreasing employment per gallon of
ethanol output. Larger capacity ethanol plants have smaller local job creation impacts per
gallon of production than smaller sized plants (see Miranowski et al. (2008) and Rajagopal
and Zilberman (2007) for a detailed literature review on these topics). We anticipate that
most future ethanol plant investments, in contrast to pre-2005 investments, will be larger scale
plants, primarily in the 100-120 MGY plant size.
We motivate this work by asking the economic factors driving the decision to invest in an
ethanol plant. In this analysis we evaluate the decision to invest in a 100MGY plant. In order
to accomplish this task, we will start with the rationale behind the investment in an ethanol
plant, where ethanol is traded in a competitive market. We model the investment decision for
an ethanol plant under risk using a real options framework. The advantage of this approach
over the traditional net present value (NPV) approach is that it provides a systematic way of
capturing price fluctuations and incorporating this information into the analysis of the optimal
timing of investment under risk. Alternatively, it compares whether to invest now or to wait
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for more information, given the current evolution of market prices and quantities. Therefore,
this method is superior to NPV because it not only captures the costs and benefits of waiting
to invest, but it also reflects the uncertainty associated with the investment project.
An issue that arises when we construct our model is whether we need to evaluate the
optimal decision to invest in different production processes. There are two kinds of production
processes in the corn-based ethanol industry, dry and wet mills. Wet mill plants require higher
investment costs and tend to have very large capacity. Yet, in the last twenty years, there has
not been a new wet mill plant constructed. Since the objective of this paper is to model the
investment decision for current ethanol plant projects, we exclude the wet mill alternative.
An important contribution of this paper is the use of actual data to estimate capital costs
and the cost function while accounting for the effects of economies of scale in production and
diseconomies of transportation costs. Given the number of ethanol plant projects in construc-
tion or to be constructed in the 2006-2007 period, capital costs have increased dramatically.
The increase in installation and construction costs changes capital costs in a significant way,
and this fact has been underestimated in previous works. We use a standard revenue-cost
spreadsheet (Swenson (2006), Tiffany and Eidman (2003)) and related literature (Miranowski
et al. (2007) and Miranowski and Rosburg (2010)) to avoid underestimating costs and include
the vast majority factors that influence the revenue and cost functions in the ethanol industry.
Related to the existing literature of ethanol plant investment (Schmit et al. (2008)), we
incorporate in our model the effects of market structure, including the endogenous effect of
firm entry and exit on ethanol gross margin (ethanol revenue minus purchases of corn). Among
other things, we find that the threshold gross margin (2007 prices) that triggers entry of new
firms in the market ranges between $1.22 and $1.67 and between $0.30 and $0.46 for exit of
existing firms. The differences in the threshold gross margins is due to, among other things,
the assumed functional forms, the assumed own elasticity demand for corn, variability of costs
across firms, and how the stochastic shock affects the gross margin.
For robustness, we tested the results using different functional forms for the components
of the gross margin as the gross margin may be affected by the stochastic shock (linear versus
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non-linear effects). We also incorporate the possibility that the production of ethanol may
affect the price of corn 1 (Gustafson (2002), Ferris and Joshi (2004), McNew and Griffith
(2005) and Fortenbery and Park (2008)).
We conduct sensitivity analysis to understand the relevance of several of the assumptions
made in the baseline case. From this analysis, we found that modeling the gross margin shocks
as geometric Brownian motion was robust to all the specifications made in the baseline case
and in the sensitivity analysis exercises. Finally, our numerical simulations using the existing
capital and production subsidy schemes help explain why smaller sized ethanol plants were
competitive with larger plants in the development of the current ethanol industry, and why
the industry has evolved in a particular way.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model.
Section 3 shows the empirical estimations used to calibrate the model. Section 4 shows the main
results of the benchmark case calibrated in section 3. Section 5 contains sensitivity analysis.
Section 6 contains a simple digression on the effects of capital and production subsidies in the
ethanol industry. Finally, section 7 draws conclusions and discusses possible extensions.
2 The Model
2.1 Characterization of the Problem and Assumptions
The model is recast from the model of Dixit (1989b). In his model, Dixit analyzes the
optimal number of foreign firms in a competitive domestic market for a particular good. Foreign
firms face a price in foreign currency P equal to the exchange rate e times the residual demand
function that they face (p(q)) denominated in domestic currency, where q is the residual supply
that foreign firms face. Thus, the price of the good in foreign currency is P = ep(q). The
source of uncertainty is the exchange rate. Foreign firms face irreversible costs for entry and
exit. In order to explain the optimal number of existing foreign firms in the market, Dixit
solves the model looking at the threshold values of P that trigger entry or exit.
1According to Fortenbery and Park (2008) the ethanol’s domestic industry used a record 13 percent of
domestic corn production in 2005 and a 20 percent in the 2006/2007 marketing year. See also, these authors
for a detailed literature review of the effects of ethanol production in corn’s prices.
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The model of Dixit (1989b) is the particular interest because the mathematical and eco-
nomic structure is identical to the model that we are trying to solve. In our model, instead of
working with the price of a particular good and foreign firms, we use the per unit (gallon) gross
margin of an ethanol plant.2 The gross margin is defined as the price of ethanol per gallon
plus co-product value (DDG3) less corn purchases. This variable is composed of a stochastic
component and an endogenous element that is a function of the aggregate ethanol supply. As
in previous literature we introduce uncertainty by a multiplicative shock on the gross margin
(Dixit and Pindyck (1994) pp. 261-265, Leahy (1993) and Dixit (1989a)).
Because of the high correlation between the price of DDG4 and the price of corn, we can
express the price of DDG as:
PDDG,t = γ0 + γ1Pc,t with γ1 > 0, (1)
where PDDG,t and Pc,t are the observed prices of DDG and corn, respectively. Let xDDG be
the co-product per gallon of ethanol for DDG, and xc be the input requirement per gallon
of ethanol for corn (i.e. the quantities of DDG obtained and corn used per gallon of ethanol
produced). Note that the contribution to the gross margin of DDG and corn is equal to
xDDGPDDG,t−xcPc,t. Then, using equation (1), we can define two constantsXc = xc−γ1xDDG
and γ0xDDG, such that xDDGPDDG,t − xcPc,t = XcPc,t + γ0xDDG. Now, we define Rt as the
gross margin in moment t and equal to:
Rt = YtRˆ(qt) = Yt(D(qt)−XcSc(qt) + γ0xDDG) with D′(qt) < 0, S′c(qt) > 0 (2)
where Yt is the stochastic component that affects the gross margin (its characterization will
be defined later), Rˆ(qt) is the part of Rt that depends on the aggregate supply of ethanol (qt),
and YtD(qt) and YtSc(qt) are the market demand for ethanol and the residual supply of corn,5
respectively. Note that, at any instant t, the area under the demand function measures the
social surplus in the ethanol market, and the area under the supply’s function of corn measures
2Schmit et al. (2008) also use the gross margin as the relevant variable in their analysis.
3DDG stands for distiller’s dry grain and it is a substitute for corn in livestock feed.
4The sample correlation for period 1995-2008 is around 0.81.
5I.e. YtSc(qt) is the residual supply of corn that face the ethanol’s industry
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the producer’s revenue of corn that is obtained from the sales to the ethanol industry. Then,
there are functions U(q) and Π(q) such that U ′(q) = YtD(qt) and Π′(q) = YtSc(qt). Following
Dixit (1989b), the functional forms for D(qt) and Sc(qt) are:
D(q) = ψd1 − q/ψd2 and Sc = D(q) = ψs1 + qψs2, with ψij > 0 i = d, s, j = 1, 2 (3)
Before stating the problem and developing the model, we begin with a brief characterization
of the ethanol industry and the stochastic process that affectsRt. The ethanol industry displays
increasing returns to scale in the use of labor and capital. However, economies of scale are
limited and eventually offset by the diseconomies of scale in transportation costs (especially
in corn) at some scale or plant size. The optimal size of an ethanol plant is outside the scope
of this paper and given the diversity of factors that may affect the optimal plant size not
consider in this paper, we assume that a 100MGY6 is the efficient scale of a plant (i.e. where
total average costs are minimized). We assume that the rest of the inputs that compose the
operating costs display a fixed coefficient technology that is independent of the scale of the
plant. We assume that the plant lives forever. This assumption is not completely unrealistic
given that an ethanol plant has a productive life of at least 20 to 30 years.
Operating costs (C) are assumed to be constant over time. Assuming that active firms
produce at their annual capacity, the profit per gallon in a given year (t) is:
pit = Rt − C, (4)
Given the characteristics of market supply and demand for a homogeneous good with an
increasing returns technology that is offset by increasing transportation costs, we treat the
ethanol industry as competitive.7
6From 2005 vast majority of ethanol plants that had been constructed or under construction are 100-120
MGY plants (see Renewable Fuels Association).
7There are other factors that lead us to model this market as a competitive industry. First, currently there
are many plants installed in US and owned for several companies (according to the Renewable Fuels Association
there are more than 170 operational plants in 26 states). Second, given the higher degree of substitution of
ethanol with gasoline monopolistic and/or oligopolistic strategies are unlikely to happen in this market beyond
government mandated use of ethanol (Aukayanagul and Miranowski (2009) show that the dynamics of the price
of ethanol closely follows the price of gasoline or oil).
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It is worth noting that the characterization and assumptions of the model imply that
changes in the market supply of ethanol will only occur by entry of new firms or exit of active
ones. However, since there is an optimal plant size, increments in the total supply of ethanol
can only be characterized with discrete changes in q. We normalize 100MGY as one unit of
output; thus, the number of firms, n, is equal to the total supply of ethanol, q.
In order to solve the model, we need to know how the stochastic component of the gross
margin evolves over time, or equivalently, how the stochastic process is characterized. This
type of process is modeled either as a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) or as a geometric
mean-reverting process (GMR).8 In order to obtain the process that best fits equation (2), we
check for the presence of a unit root in an AR(1) model for Y . The presence of a unit root
rules out the possibility that can be modeled as a GMR. We use the augmented Dickey-Fuller
and the Phillips-Perron for unit root tests. In both cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that Y follows a random walk representation at a 90% percent confidence level (see Appendix
1). Therefore, we do not reject the presence of a unit root, and assume that the process that
governs the stochastic shock follows the following GBM9 representation:
dY = αY dt+ σY dz, (5)
Firms are assumed to have rational expectations about the underlying process of R. Also,
we assume that exist a maximum number of (N) potential firms exist that can be operating
in the industry. Finally, firms must incur a sunk cost I in order to produce one unit of output
and must pay a cost E if they want to exit the industry. In principle E < 0, the exit cost
can be positive if some part of the investment is not irreversible. We assume that I + E > 0,
so we rule out, in terms of Dixit and Pindyck (1994), a ”money machine” of rapid cycles of
investment and abandonment. The assumption of irreversibility relies on the fact that most
of the plant and other equipment is specific to the ethanol plant.10 Also, instead of assuming
risk neutral investors, we modify the model of Dixit (1989b) by incorporating a risk-adjusted
8See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for more details.
9Schmit et al. (2008) also found that the gross margin follows a GBM.
10Note that in this model, firms do not have the option to shut down and a restart and idle firm (see Schmit
et al. (2008) for a model that considers this issue for the ethanol industry).
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expected rate as in the model of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) pags. 215-219. Thus we impose:
µ = r + φρσx, (6)
where φ = (rm − r)/σm is the market price of risk, with rm and σm are the expected return
and standard deviation of the market portfolio, the parameter ρ is the correlation between the
asset under valuation and the market portfolio, and σx is the standard deviation of the asset.
Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994) (pag. 149), let us define the convenience yield δ as:
δ = µ− α, (7)
So far we have described some aspects of the ethanol industry but have not stated the
problem under question. That is, we want to establish the threshold values of R that triggers
the decision to enter the market by investing in a new ethanol plant and the decision for an
active firm to exit the market. Therefore, we find the entry gross margin that maximize the
value of a new plant entering in a competitive market or the exit gross margin that maximize
the value of an active plant leaving that market.
2.2 Solving the model
Except for the unique characteristics of the model such as the composition of the gross
margin, the residual supply of corn and the inclusion of a risk-adjusted return as discount
factor; the solution closely follows the explanation of Dixit (1989b). The nth firm’s contribution
to utility less corn revenues is defined as:
Rn = [U(n)− U(n− 1)]− [Πc(n)−Πc(n− 1)] + Y [n− (n− 1)]γ0xDDG, (8)
Imposing U(0) = 0 and Πc(0) = 0, define SSn as the area under the demand curve for
ethanol minus the area under the residual supply of corn up to the nth firm:
SSn = U(n)−Πc(n) =
n∑
j=1
Rj , (9)
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In a similar way, define Wn as the sum of the operating costs up to the nth firm:
Wn =
n∑
j=1
Cj , (10)
With a constant C across firms equation (10) simplifies to Wn = nC. Since firms are
competitive and have rational expectations, we can find the industry equilibrium by maximizing
the expected discounted present value of the overall surplus of this industry:
E

∞∫
o
{SSn −Wn} e−µtdt−
∑
i
(I[∆ni]+ + E[∆ni]−) e−µi
 , (11)
where at instants t = i the number of active firms change, and [∆ni]+ and [∆ni]− denote
an increase and a decrease of active firms, respectively. Following Dixit (1989b), the solution
to this dynamic programming problem (equation (11)) can be seen as a sequence of option
princing problems. We denote as Vn(R) the value to the social planner when n firms are
active.11
Thus, for each n we can regard the collection of the first n firms as an asset. The asset
produces dividends in the form of the current flow of net surplus as well as capital gains since
the value changes with the stochastic movements of R. Also, this asset is an option to buy other
assets, namely collections of (n + 1) and (n − 1) firms or new entry or exit, respectively.12,13
The exercise prices of the respective options are I and E. At the values of R where it becomes
optimal to exercise these options, Vn(R) is linked to Vn+1(R) and Vn−1(R) by the standard
option pricing. Thus, we need to determine Vn(R) for all n simultaneously in order to solve
the problem.
We use standard techniques for option pricing, constructing a portfolio with suitable com-
binations of the asset to be valued (in our case Vn ) and the underlying asset that spans the
11Dixit (1989b) solves the problem in terms of Y rather than R. However given the functional forms of R
and the GBM follows by Y , the results are identical.
12Given the concavity of SSn (equation (9)), the convexity of Wn (equation (10)) and the linearity of I and
E, there is no need to consider transitions from n to (n + i) or (n − i) with i > 1 (see Dixit (1989b) for more
detail).
13In this model firms do not have the option to mothball a plant and restart operations again like in Schmit
et al. (2008). If this were the case, we will need a social planner that takes account of these options also. That
is, the planner needs to consider opening a new plant versus restarting a mothballed one.
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valued asset (Rn).14,15 Over an interval of time or values of R where n remains fixed, the
evolution of R and Vn are given by Ito’s Lemma:
dR = R(n)(αdt+ σdz)), (12)
dVn =
V ′n(R)dR+ 0.5V ′′n (R)σ2R2dt[
αRV ′n(R) + 0.5V ′′n (R)σ2R2
]
dt+ σRV ′n(R)dz
, (13)
Now, consider a portfolio consisting of a long position for one unit of Vn and a short position
for V ′n units of Rn. Then, the return of this portfolio in an interval of time dt is capital gains
and dividends:
[(r − δ)RV ′n(R) + 0.5V ′′n (R)σ2R2 + SSn −Wn]dt, (14)
Since this return is riskless, equation (14) must equal to the risk free return in the interval
dt or:
[(r − δ)RV ′n(R) + 0.5V ′′n (R)σ2R2 + SSn −Wn] = r(Vn(R)− V ′n(R)), (15)
where we cancel dt on both sides of the equation. Following Dixit (1989b) and Dixit and
Pindyck (1994), equation (15) has a known general solution given by:
Vn(R) = AnRβ1 +BnRβ2 + SSn(R)/δ −Wn/r ,β1 < 0 and β2 > 0, (16)
where An and Bn are constants to be determined. The coefficients β1 and β2 are the two
solutions for the following quadratic expression:
0.5βσ2(β − 1) + β(r − δ)− r = 0 (17)
The economic interpretation of equation (16) is the following. The last two terms of equa-
tion (16) give the expected present discounted value of maintaining exactly n firms forever,
14See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) chapters 4 to 6 for a detailed treatment of these types of problems with GBM,
and chapters 7 and 8 for a solution to a problem very similar to the one at hand.
15Four purposes of simplification we will denote R(n) as Rn.
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starting with a gross margin R. The first term of equation (16), AnRβ1 , is the value of the
option to shut down some existing firms and the second term, BnRβ1 , is the option of adding
some new firms. Equation (16) has the following boundary conditions for endpoints n = 0 and
n = N . If n = 0, then A0 = 0. In words, when there are no firms established, the shutdown
option has zero value. Similarly, if n = N there are no firms available to enter the market,
hence BN = 0(i.e. the option value of adding an additional firm has zero value).
The next step is to determine the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions for those
values of R where Vn, Vn+1 and Vn−1 are linked. First, let REn denote the value of R where the
social planner finds it optimal to introduce the nth firm when (n− 1) firms previously existed.
Then, it must be true that:
Vn−1(REn ) = Vn(R
E
n )− I, (18a)
V ′n−1(R
E
n ) = V
′
n(R
E
n ), (18b)
where equations (18a) and (18b) are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, re-
spectively. Similarly, let Ren the value of R when it is optimal to shut-down a firm starting
from n. Thus we have:
Vn(Ren) = Vn−1(R
e
n)− E, (19a)
V ′n(R
e
n) = V
′
n−1(R
e
n), (19b)
If we substitute equations (16) into equations (18) (or equations (19)), we get the following
relationships:
an = An −An−1, bn = Bn−1 −Bn, (20a)
An =
n∑
j=1
aj , Bn =
N∑
j=n+1
bj (20b)
Using equations (2), (8) - (10) and (20), equations (18) and (19) become:
anR
Eβ1
n + bnR
Eβ2
n +R
E
n /δ − Cn/r − I = 0, (21a)
62
β1anR
Eβ1−1
n + β2bnR
Eβ2−1
n + 1/δ = 0, (21b)
anR
eβ1
n + bnR
eβ2
n +R
e
n/δ − Cn/r − E = 0, (21c)
β1anR
eβ1−1
n + β2bnR
eβ2−1
n + 1/δ = 0, (21d)
That is, for each n ∈ [0, N ], we have a system of four equations (21) with four unknowns,
REn , R
e
n, an and bn. Solving for these unknowns we obtain the solution for the variables of
interest, that is the thresholds REn and R
e
n. Note that the imposition of an arbitrary maximum
number of firms,16 N ; does not affect the solution to equations (21) (i.e. equations (21) are
only functions of n). The arbitrary maximum number of firms only affects the number of
independent systems (21) to be solved, and the value of the social planner function (equation
(16)), but there is no effect on the threshold values of the gross margin, which are the variables
of interest.
3 Calibration
We start by describing the parameters that are taken from historic data of prices and
quantities and the literature. All data were seasonal adjusted and deflated at 2007 prices.
Technical values for R and costs are taken from Swenson (2006), Tiffany and Eidman (2003),
Roe et al. (2006), Miranowski et al. (2007) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
database.17
We have available data from the SEC database for four firms with 100MGY capacity that
started production in 2007 or later. The average start-up capital cost for these plants was
$171.9 million at 2007 prices or I = 1.72. We assume as in Schmit et al. (2008) that the exit
cost E is equal to 0.2I, or E = 0.344.
16In the calibration Section, the value of N will respond to an economic intuition. Basically, note that
for a fixed value of the shock Y , say Yss, the gross margin R(n, Yss) is a decreasing function of n. Then,
N will be chosen as the maximum number of firms that support positive gross margins, i.e. R(N,Yss) =
minR(n, Yss)
∞
n=0 > 0, where Yss is the calibration value of the shock.
17All publicly listed ethanol firms are required by the Securities and Exchange Commission to provide initial
and periodic financial data on their operations. Typically, for larger, multi-plant firms provide less detailed
information, but newer operations provide more detailed financial data each ethanol plant.
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We divide operating costs, C, in four components: fixed transportation costs (FTC),
variable transportation costs (V TC), tax credit per Gallon (TC), and remaining operating
costs (C0). Therefore, total operating cost is equal to:
C = C0 + FTC + V TC − TC, (22)
The cost C0 is composed as follows. We assume a total labor force of 45 employees for a
100MGY plant. We assume, as in Swenson (2006), that the management costs are 10% of the
total labor force cost, while Tiffany and Eidman (2003) estimate management costs of 33%.
Adding other costs, we find that operating costs net of transportation and tax credits costs
are equal to C0 = 0.91 (See Table 12).
Tax credit per gallon, TC, is equal to $0.45 beginning January 2009 based on the Food
and Energy Security Act of 2007, and referred to as the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit
(VEETC). Variable transportation costs are equal to:
V TC = CmD, (23)
where Cm is the cost per mile of transporting corn and D is the average hauling distance to
the plant. Following Miranowski and Rosburg (2010), this distance is calculated for a circular
supply area with a square road grid based on the formulation by French (1960) and is equal
to:
D = 0.4789
√
Sxc/(640YBB), (24)
where S is the size of the plant (Sxc is the total annual requirement of bushels of corn), YB
is the yield per acre of corn equal to 160 bushels according to USDA estimates, and B is
the biomass (bushels of corn) density available for supply to the ethanol plant, equal to 15%
according to estimates of Perlack and Turhollow (2002) and own calculations.18 Hence, the
average distance (D) is equal to 23.3 miles.
18I am grateful to Alicia Rosburg for helping me in the calculations of the variable transportation costs.
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The cost per mile, Cm, is calibrated such that the scale of plant has the lowest total average
cost (without FTC), C = C0+V TC−TC+rI. The cost per mile is calculated as follows. We
calculate the investment cost using the power formula (see Kumarappan (2003)) for sizes equal
to (100 + ²) and (100 − ²) and ² = 0.1. Thus, we have KS = (S/100)θK100 for θ ∈ [0.6, 0.7],
where S stands for the plant size (100 + ²) and (100 − ²), KS is the capital cost for a plant
of size S and K100 is the cost of the 100MGY plant. The resulting value of Cm is 0.22. This
value is lower than the one estimated by Miranowski and Rosburg (2010) which is 0.35, but
in the range of the estimates of Kumar et al. (2005). Fixed transportation costs (FTC) are
obtained from Kumar et al. (2005) and it is equal 0.092.
Rt = Yt(Pe,t + 0.0033PDDG,t − 0.3374Pc,t), (25)
where Pe,t is the price of ethanol. Using monthly data for the period 1995-2008,19 we estimate
the assumed linear relationship between the price of corn and DDG for the period 1995-2008
(equation (1)) with coefficients γ0 = 9.38 and γ1 = 38.11; and we find Xc = 0.263 and
γ0xDDG = 0.096 . From Luchansky and Monks (2009), we obtain the own-price elasticity
demand of ethanol, ²E , equal to 1.65 in absolute value. Also from Fortenbery and Park (2008)
we use an elasticity of the price of corn with respect to ethanol, ²c, equal to 0.16. Based to the
ethanol plant information from the Renewable Fuels Association we calculate an initial number
of plants n = 85 (total ethanol capacity of production in MGY at 2008 divided 100MGY). For
the 1995-2008 period at prices of 2007, we calculate Pess = 2.04 and Pcss = 3.38 for average
data of the prices ethanol and corn, respectively. Then, from equation (3) we calculate:
ψd2 = n/Pess|εE | 56.84
ψd1 = n/ψd2 + Pess 2.98
ψs2 = Pcss/nεc 0.0076
ψs1 = Pcss − nψs2 2.59
The number of potential firms, N , is calibrated such that Rˆ(N) = min Rˆ(n)
∞
n=0 > 0, and
equal to 118. The risk free interest rate, r, is equal to 0.032 annual according to the 10-year
19All prices were deflated using the producer price index (PPI) with base 2007. Also, data on prices and
production of ethanol were seasonally adjusted.
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T-Bill real interest rate (source: Federal Reserve). After obtaining the historical series of
shocks (Y ) as explained in Appendix A, we calibrate the parameters of equation (5) to equal
α = 0.0044 and σ = 0.11,20,21 where we use the fact that σ is equal to the sample standard
deviation of ln(Yt/Yt−1) and α− 0.5σ2 is equal to sample mean of ln(Yt/Yt−1).22 Finally, the
risk-adjusted return (µ) for the ethanol industry was calculated using historical data of the
S&P 500 index (as the portfolio market) and Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. (as the proxy for
the ethanol industry), using monthly data for the 1995-2008 period we have that µ equals
0.0063.23
4 Numerical Results
In this section we analyze the numerical results of the baseline model developed in Sections 2
and 3. The results presented here will be used as a point of comparison with several exercises
in the next two sections. There are two significant results shown in Table 13 and Figure
14, where we illustrate the threshold values of R for different numbers of plants. First, the
threshold values of the gross margin are independent of the number of plants in the market.
The constancy of the threshold values of R is due to several factors: Y follows a GBM (Lipsey
and Lancaster (1956) and Dixit (1989b)), the gross margin is linear in the shocks, and operating
and investment costs are independent of the number of firms. Second, as the optimal number of
plants increases, the threshold values of the shocks (Y ) for entering and exiting go up. Let Y En
and Y en be the values of the shock Y when entry and exit of the nth firm occurs, respectively.
Therefore, the changes in Y En and Y
e
n exactly compensate the changes in Rˆ(n),
24 such that
20Following Odening et al. (2007) for their simulated exercise, the parameters of equation (5) were calculated
taking the values of the gross margin inside the interval [R
o±σo], where Ro is the sample mean of the observed
gross margin and σo its standard deviation.
21It is worth to make a digression about the parameters of equation (5); the parameter alpha is highly
sensitive to the standard deviation σ. In fact the ratio of the σ to the estimated mean of ln(Yt/Yt−1), depending
of the data transformation, is in a range of 12 to 35 times. Also, the standard deviation of ln(Yt/Yt−1) is
relatively stable (in a range of 0.13 to 0.11) to different data transformation (seasonal adjusted method and
deflator used); and also, the mean of ln(Yt/Yt−1) changes in small proportions (in a range of -0.0022 to 0.007).
Thus, the estimated drift parameter α varies considerably regarding the transformation data, while the standard
deviation σ remains relatively stable.
22The parameters estimated are close to the ones found by Schmit et al. (2008).
23The value of the discount rate is similar to the one found by Kumarappan (2003) and the one used by
Schmit et al. (2008).
24Remember from equation (2) that R(n) = Y Rˆ(n).
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RE(n) and Re(n) remain constant across n.
Note that the NPVs for entry and exit are C + rI and C − rE, respectively. Our optimal
rule solutions, RE(n) and Re(n), exceed the NPV rules. We find that RE(n) is 50% higher
than C + rI (for all n), while and Re(n) is 54% lower than C − rE. This fact is explained by
Dixit (1989b) as an economic hysteresis,25 since the actual number of firms does not change if
the market’s gross margin, R, hits the NPV gross margins either for entry or exit (i.e. C + rI
and C − rE, respectively). Thus, n only varies when R reaches the thresholds values RE(n)
and Re(n).
In our model, the gross margin that induces one or more firms to enter, RE(n), is four times
higher than the gross margin that induces exit, Re(n), while this gap for the NPV approach
is just 10% ([C + rI/(C − rE) − 1] × 100). Note that the values of RE(n) and Re(n) are
compatible with any number of firms. What it is important to understand in this model is
that entry or exit only occurs if R hits the corresponding bounds.
Our values are for RE(n) and Re(n) are 1.44 and 0.35, respectively. Schmit et al. (2008)
found that RE(n) = 1.33, while Re(n) = 0.38. The differences, are due to several reasons.
First, Schmit et al. (2008) uses a model where temporary suspension is allowed resulting in a
significantly lower value. Second, they calibrate their model using a shorter time series (from
1998 to June of 2008). Finally, and most importantly, the authors model a totally myopic firm.
In this regard, the firm does not take into account the effect of its entry/exit into the market
and the decisions of possible competitors (myopia in the sense of Leahy (1993)). Also, the firm
is myopic by assuming that changes in gross margin are purely stochastic, reducing equation
(2) to and affecting the estimation of the parameters of equation (5).
We compare the model’s results with the observed data. In Figure 15, for the period 1995-
2008, we compare average annual data for R, say Rot , with the results of the model. In general,
the observed data remains under the threshold values of the model. Major differences are
found when we compare REn and R
o
t . For the year 2006, we find that R
o
t is 50% higher than
REn .
25Hysteresis is defined by Dixit (1989b) as an effect that persists after the cause that brought it about has
been removed.
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The constancy of the threshold gross margins across n in our model does not allow us to
determine the optimal number of firms. However, it is worth noticing two key elements of this
model. First, as mentioned above, the objective of this model is to determine the threshold
gross margins that trigger changes in the number of active firms, which were normalized to
be equal to the ethanol supply. Second, but related to the first point, is that the entrance
of new firms depends heavily on the size of the shock Y . It is easy to think that any time
that R hits its bounds; an unlimited number of firms may enter or exit from the market. This
conclusion is wrong. In order to fully understand the dynamics of the model, let us consider
an example with a sequential entry of firms. Assume that the actual number of firms is n1.
Let Yn+1 be the shock such that R(Yn+1, n1 + 1) = RE . If more than one firm (n + i,i ≥ 2)
enters into the market, then R(Yn+1, n1 + i) < RE , because the increased supply of ethanol
will lower the market equilibrium price of ethanol, and the price of corn will increase via the
increased demand for corn. Thus, the result of unlimited entry is inconsistent with the rule
of the optimal gross margin threshold for entry for a number of firms larger than n + 1. In
this way, the magnitude of the shock to Y is critical to the number of new firms entering the
industry or active firms exiting the market.
To clarify the ideas, consider an example provided in Table 13. Assume that the initial
number of firms is n = 70, the actual shock is equal to 1 and the gross margin is R(1, 70) = 1.02.
If in the immediate interval of time dt, the shock Y goes to 1.21, then exactly ten new firms
will enter the market such that the gross margin is equal to RE(80)(new size of the market
equals 80). With a shock equal to 1.38, the size of the market will increase to 90 firms. On
the other hand, if Y falls to 0.24, ten firms will exit the market until the gross margin is equal
to Re(60).
A salient feature of our model is the extra rents, as defined by Leahy (1993), that arise by
the discrete changes in the supply of ethanol. Let ² a small positive constant (i.e. ²→ 0) and
define Y˜ En = Y
E
n − ² and Y˜ en = Y en + ². Also, define the gross margins Rmaxn−1 = Y˜ En Rˆ(n− 1) and
Rminn+1 = Y˜
e
n Rˆ(n + 1). Note that by definition of gross margin (equation (2)) and the optimal
threshold rule for entry and exit, we have that Rmaxn−1 > REn and Rminn+1 > Ren. That is, the n
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active firms in the market are able to capture extra rents beyond (below) REn (R
e
n) until the
point that the shock Y reaches the level of Y En+1(Y
e
n+1). Figure 16 depicts the extra rents; the
first pane depicts the maximum gross margin attainable for the n active firms. These gross
margins increase with the number of active firms because the value of the shocks Y that triggers
entry increase with n. Finally, if the change in the supply of ethanol tends to be continuous,
the extra rents tend to disappear; in the limit as dq (change in supply) is continuous our model
will be identical to the models of Leahy (1993) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) pags. 261-264.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
5.1 Variable costs
In this section we run two exercises: we consider a change in operating costs and investment
costs. In the first exercise, operating costs vary by 10 percent around the mean value across
firms, resulting in:
Cn = C − 0.1 + n0.1/nss, (26)
where nss is equal to the number of firms used in the calibration section. One reason for an
increase in operating costs is if firms have to settle in marginal areas where the yield per acre of
corn is lower26 increasing transportation costs, or firms pay more for natural gas, or there could
be a local saturation of ethanol plants. Table 14 and Figure 17 show the numerical results for
the increase in operating costs. With an increase in operating costs, the thresholds RE(n) and
Re(n) grow with n, and the increments are linear. Also, when Cn is given by equation (26)
and n = 1 we have that RE(1) and Re(1) are lower compared with the baseline case (10% and
17%, respectively); and at n = N , RE(N) and Re(N) are higher relative to the benchmark
case (8% and 14%, respectively).
The second sensitivity exercise allows entry (I) and exit (E) costs to vary in a similar
fashion to equation (26), except that I and E vary 15 percent around the mean value. Thus,
we modify irreversible investment and exit costs in the following way:
26Note that we still assume that a 100MGY plant is the most cost efficient one.
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In = I − 0.15 + n0.15/nss and En = E − 0.15 + n0.15/nss (27)
This exercise allows us to capture, in a nave27 (or primitive) way, characteristics of the 2005-
07 period when several firms wanted to enter in the market. The demand for plant construction
and installation substantially increased capital cost during this period. We assume that Cn is
given by equation (26) and that the industry initially has nss firms. Table 15 and Figure 18
illustrate the results of this exercise. If R was initially equal to 1.44, and Y increases by 1.5%,
only one firm will find it profitable to enter the industry. If Y increases by 4.7%, three firms
will enter the ethanol market. Finally, a 17% positive shock to Y will result in ten more firms
entering the market.
5.2 Changing functional forms of ethanol demand and corn supply
How sensitive are the results to different functional forms for D(q) and Sc(q)? To test
the sensitivity to functional forms, we change the linear functional forms from equation (3) to
constant elasticity functions:
D(q) = ψd1/qψd2 and Sc(q) = ψs1qψs2 (28)
The values of ψd2 and ψs2 are equal to the values reported in the calibration section for the
elasticities of the own demand for ethanol and the price of corn with respect to the supply of
ethanol. The parameters ψd1 and ψs1 match the value of R from the calibration section. In this
example, the model uses the functional forms in equation (28) in place of equation (3) and the
observed stochastic shock (Y ) changes. These factors lead to a modification in the parameters
estimated in equation (5) and a possible modification of the GBM assumption. However, if
the stochastic process remains GBM and all costs are constant across n, the threshold values
of R will be constant and independent from the number of firms.
27We call nave this exercise, because we are not assuming that investment (and exit) costs only increase for
new plants. If this was the case, the problem will be more complex because the social planner would have to
simultaneously evaluate option values for n, (n − 1), (n − 2), and (n + 1), (n + 2), rather than options values
only for n, (n− 1) and (n+ 1).
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With the functional forms in equation (28), the stochastic process that governs Y is still
GBM as in equation (5), except α = 0.0044 and σ = 0.12.28 Table 16 and Figure 19 display
the outcomes for this exercise. With the constant elasticity demand for ethanol and residual
supply of corn, RE(n) is a 15.8% higher compared with the benchmark case, while Re(n) is 6%
higher. Thus, for the entry gross margin, we find, in some degree, that there is a significant
difference in both types of functional forms.
5.3 Changing initial state of n
So far the model has been calibrated for the average values for the 1995-2008 period, with
the initial n equal to nss in the calibration section. How will results change if we calibrate
the model to the 2008 situation? That is, how the results change if we set nss to the total
capacity of the industry in 2008. Recall that any modification in the calibration that affects
Rt = YtRˆ(nt), will change the parameters’ value in equation (5) and henceforth the solutions to
the model. Therefore, we can expect that modifying the evolution of Yt may lead to significant
changes in the values of the drift and variance of equation (5) and changes in the numerical
solutions.
The exercise can be viewed from the standpoint of an investor at the beginning of 2009
who is trying to decide when to invest in the ethanol industry if he bases his actions with the
information available at 2009. The parameters of equation (5) are now α = 0.01 and σ = 0.12.
The threshold values for RE(n) and Re(n) are slightly higher than in the benchmark case (see
Table 17 and Figure 20). The percentage changes are 5.6% and 4% for the upper and lower
bounds, respectively. Therefore, the results are not significantly different when the model is
calibrated using average values from 1995-2008 compared to using 2008 values only.
28We use the same procedure as in the calibration section. However, because of the exponential increment
in the ethanol production, which gives unrealistic values for the shock Y in the early years; we calculate the
parameters for the 2000-08 period. Otherwise, we get a drift parameter significantly large and equal to a 70%
annual increment.
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5.4 The elasticity of demand for ethanol
In this section we analyze the effect of the own price elasticity of ethanol. We conduct two
different exercises. In the first exercise, we cut the value of elasticity reported by Luchansky
and Monks (2009) in half from -1.60 to -0.8.29 This numerical example allow us to analyze
the effect of the elasticity of demand for ethanol on the size of the shocks (Y ) needed to cause
entry of new firms in the industry.
We compare two types of functional forms: the baseline case (linear functions) and the
one constant elasticity function (5.2, equation (28)). In order to track the relevance of the
elasticity of demand, we keep the same calibrated values for dY from Section 3 for the linear
case and from Section 5.2 for the constant elasticity case. Therefore, only the sizes of the
shocks Y E(n) and Y e(n) change, while the gross margin thresholds remain the same. The
calibrated parameters are ψd1 = 4.1 and ψd2 = 28.4 for the linear demand and ψd1 = 333.3
for the constant elasticity case. Figure 21 displays the main result. With a lower elasticity,
the growth rate of the shocks is higher with respect to the baseline cases. For example, using
tables 13, 16 and 18, and taking n = 80, now Y E(n) is 56% higher in the linear case and a
20% larger for the constant elasticity case with a lower elasticity demand.
Besides the effects of the residual supply of corn, the economic intuition behind the results
above is as follows. Shocks on Y that cause displacements in an elastic demand are translated
into quantities rather than prices. Therefore, only small perturbations on Y are needed to
cause movements in the equilibrium number of firms. To clarify concepts, we develop a simple
example for the linear case. For simplicity, we only consider the upper barrier case RE(n).
Let e1 and e2 the subscripts representing the elastic and inelastic gross margins30 functions,
respectively. Assume that the initial market equilibrium has 65 firms (n1 = 65) and a gross
margin equal to RE . This equilibrium is displayed in Figure 22, where the gross margins
functions D1e1 (elastic case) and D1e2 (inelastic case) intersect the threshold RE at n = n1.
Now we ask: how large of shocks are needed to bring the equilibrium of firms to 70 (n2 = 70 )?
29In the early stages of the ethanol industry the ethanol’s demand was inelastic rather than elastic, Rask
(1998) for the period 1984-1993 reported an own demand elasticity equal to -0.37.
30The only difference between the two is the elasticity of the demand for ethanol.
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Let Y Ee1 and Y
E
e2 denote the shocks such that the gross margin functions induce displacement
respectively from D1e1 and D1e2 and from D2e1 and D2e2, respectively. The new market
equilibriums are reached at the value RE and n2 number of firms. From Figure 22 we can
see that the elastic gross margin function (subscript e1) requires a smaller shock in order to
induce 10 new firms to enter the industry compared to the inelastic gross function (subscript
e1); therefore, Y Ee1 > Y
E
e2 .
The second exercise explores the effects of introducing the price elasticity into the stochastic
process of R. So far we have assumed that the shock Y affects the gross margin linearly (i.e.
Rt = YtRˆ(qt)). Now, we assume that equation (2) is changed such that:
Rt = Rˆ(qt, Yt) = (D(qt, Yt)−XcSc(qt, Yt) + Ytγ0xDDG), (29)
where the demand for ethanol and the residual supply for corn take the following functional
forms:
D(q, Y ) = ψd1(Y/q)ψd2 and Sc(q, Y ) = ψs1(Y q)ψs2 (30)
By Ito’s lemma dR is equal to
dR = R(n)(αˆdt+ σˆdz), (31)
where the drift and the variance of equation (31) are giving by:
αˆ = (ψd2 −Xcψs2)α+ 0.5σ2[(ψd2 − 1)ψd2 −Xc(ψs2 − 1)ψs2], (32)
σˆ = (ψd2 −Xcψs2 + γ0xDDG)σ, (33)
The theoretical solution of the model does not change because R still displays a GBM
process. Parameters calibration remains unchanged from section 3. However, we need to
recalibrate the parameters of equation (5) using the observed data and equations (29) to (33).
It is noted that the observed value of Y cannot be obtained in the same straightforward method
as in sections 3 and 5.2 since Y does not have a closed form solution (see Appendix A).
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We will refer the model from Section 5.2 as case 1 and the model described by equations
(29) to (33) as case 2. In Table 19 we report the thresholds values for the gross margin and the
shock for case 2. The upper threshold gross margin is 16% lower in case 2 compared to case
1, while the lower threshold gross margin is 32% higher for case 2 relative to case 1. In fact,
the gap between RE(n) and Re(n) is narrower in case 2 than case 1 (see second pane Figure
23). What is interesting from this last example is that, the stochastic shock that affects the
gross margin (via demand and supply elasticities) narrows the significantly the gap between
the two threshold values. Also, we still observe that Y is driven by a GBM and that there are
no significant numerical differences between model specifications.
6 Investing in small plants: the effects of subsidies
The numerical simulations in the previous sections were calculated using the VEETC (see
section 3). This production subsidy applies for any plant size and was created to promote
the ethanol industry as a whole. In this section, we consider the capital costs and production
subsidies31 that would be needed to induce an investor to construct a small scale plant, say
50MGY. In particular, we are interested in the level of capital subsidies under two types of
schemes. In the first case we consider no additional subsidies beyond the VEETC, while in the
second case, we consider an additional production subsidy for small capacity plants.
We start with a subsidy on capital costs and ask what capital subsidy is needed for an
investor to be indifferent between installing a 50MGY plant or a 100MGY plant? When
attempting to answer this question, a model limitation arises: the increasing returns to scale
in the ethanol industry. This characteristic allows only discrete changes in the ethanol supply.
Thus, we cannot address different size plants in our model that restricts discrete changes in
supply equal to one unit of output.32
In fact, if we model a Ramsey problem where a social planner tries to find the subsidy
that maximizes the expected social surplus, we should find that the optimal subsidy is zero.
31See Miranowski (2007) and Schumacher (2006) for a detailed explanation of different ethanol subsidy schemes
for US for the ethanol subsidy.
32Remember that 1 unit of output is equal to a 100MGY plant.
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To see this point, imagine that there is no exit costs33 and that a Ramsey planner can choose
between a 50MGY and a 100MGY plant and a level of subsidy such that the investor is
indifferent between both plant sizes34 (or strictly prefers the small plant). Note two things:
first, any investment subsidy decreases the total social surplus as long as consumers finance
it; and second, a Ramsey planner will try to choose a firm size such that economies of scale
are exhausted (i.e. a 100MGY plant) so the social surplus is maximized. Since both effects go
in the same direction, there is no incentive for a social planner to optimally choose a positive
subsidy in a competitive market.
In order to get a positive subsidy, we need a model where such a subsidy is imposed ad-
hoc or where other elements affect the social surplus (such as an ethanol plant that serves
a community and hires local labor). However, such models create complications because the
social planner needs to compare several option values. For example, an option for a 100MGY
plant against a 50MGY plant or two 50MGY plants.
Instead of pursuing such a complicated model, which is beyond the scope of this paper,
we ask what capital subsidy is needed to induce the installation of two 50MGY35 plants (i.e.
equal to one unit of output in our model) such that equations (21) hold at the threshold values
found for the benchmark case. Let θEn and θ
e
n be the subsidies (in percentage) such that:
anR
Eβ1
n − bnREβ2n +REn /δ − C50,n/r − I50(1− θEn ) = 0, (34a)
anR
eβ1
n − bnReβ2n +Ren/δ − C50,n/r + E50(1− θen) = 0, (34b)
where C50,n, I50 and E50 are the operating, entry and exit costs of two 50MGY plants when
the total supply of the industry is n. From Swenson (2006) and calculations of transportation
costs using equation (24), we obtain C50,n = 1.06. This value is 2.5 cents higher compared
to the 100MGY case (C100,n = 1.01) due to the net effect of the diseconomies of scale in
labor and the diseconomies of scale in transportation costs. Following Kumarappan (2003)
33This assumption allow us to simplify our explanation.
34Otherwise, if the indifference condition does not hold no rational firm will chose freely to invest in a small
plant.
35Note that the model allows only discrete changes in the ethanol supply and equal to one unit of output.
Thus we ”approximate” the solution for the subsidies treating two 50MGY plants as one unit of output.
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and using the power formula as explained in the calibration section, we find I50 = 2.19 and we
set E50 = 0.2I50 as in the benchmark case.
Because we know that optimal thresholds are constant across n (and therefore an and bn),
we only need to calculate θEn and θ
e
n once. The values that satisfy equations (34) are θ
E
n = 0.50
and θen = −1.17. Thus, while plant investment cost (per gallon) is 27% higher than in a
100MGY, the incentive required to induce investment in small size plant is 51%.36
Finally, we consider the addition of a production subsidy to small plants. In particular,
we incorporate a federal subsidy known as the Small Producer Tax Credit (SPTC), equal to
$0.10 for the first 15 million gallons of production per year for 60MGY plants or smaller. We
again ask what capital subsidy is needed for an investor to be indifferent between installing a
50MGY plant or a 100MGY plant? When the addition of the SPTC, the operating costs for
a 50MGY plant decreases to a value equal to 1.03. We repeat the exercise of finding the rates
of capital subsidy that satisfy equations (34) at the thresholds gross margins of the baseline
case. With this operating cost, we find that subsidy-rates are θEn = 0.07 and θ
e
n = 0.91. Thus,
a capital subsidy equal to 7% is necessary for an investor to be indifferent between a 100MGY
plant and a 50MGY. That is, the effect of the subsidy on production for small plants is so
powerful, that only a small capital subsidy is needed to promote investment in 50MGY plants.
In addition, if we also consider subsidy programs that are no longer in effect, such as the USDA
Commodity Credit Corporation, or local and state subsidy programs for small plants, then we
will find evidence in support of 50MGY and smaller plants being preferable to 100MGY plants
by investors in the past.
7 conclusions
We modeled the decision for a firm operating in competitive a market to enter or exit the
ethanol industry. We find that the thresholds that trigger changes in the ethanol supply for the
industry largely exceed the traditional NPV boundaries. Also, the model is relatively stable to
changes in assumptions and functional forms. Changing the functional forms of the demand
36The linearity of investment and operating costs imposed by the model implies that the subsidy is the same
for one or two plants.
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for ethanol or the residual supply of corn may affect in some degree the results.
Thus, our results are robust among several specifications of the model. One of the main
findings is that we never reject the null hypothesis of unit roots for the shocks that hit the gross
margin; the shocks were modeled as a GBM. Also, we find that there is a stable relationship
for the lower threshold gross margins. For the upper bound, R fluctuates between $1.22 and
$1.67, while the lower bound of R fluctuates around $0.30 and $0.35. We conduct several
sensitivity tests in support of these results.
Economies of scale in ethanol plants make it optimal to invest in large scale plants until
transportation diseconomies offset scale economies. All other things equal, expected returns
to large sized plants exceed returns to small size plants and thus, large sized plants will prevail
in long run equilibrium. However, prior to 2005, while oil price remain low, small plants were
the norm in the ethanol industry due to government subsidies to small scale plants, such as
the SPTC. The capital and production subsidy schemes ”leveled the playing field” for small
and presumably local investors. Coupled with the fact that the local investors were able to
capture an extra local rent (e.g., higher cash rents, increased local jobs, increased local incomes,
improved personal consumption) from investment in a small size ethanol plant, provided the
impetus for the initial expansion in the industry.
Several extensions can be made to this work. First, this paper was initiated when oil and
gasoline prices were high, and a large number of new ethanol plants were under consideration.
But under current oil and gasoline prices, what are the implications for the ethanol industry as
a whole? An interesting extension to this model would be to consider firms that temporarily
mothball production operations. In this case, the model would be modified to consider a social
planner who faces several options, such as entry of new plants versus activating idle plants,
and mothballing existing plants versus exit of existing plants.
Second, what is the future of new technology that uses biomass or cellulose as feedstock for
ethanol? The ethanol industry is moving in the direction of using new technology to produce
cellulosic ethanol, especially under the revised Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS.2) contained
in the Food and Energy Security Act of 2007. How will the cellulosic ethanol industry evolve?
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What are the economic costs to society of this policy prescription? It is possible to answer
these questions using the methodological framework of this paper?
Finally, how will the new fuel composition mandate affect the profitability of both the corn
and cellulosic ethanol industry? The US mandate on fuel composition requires an increasing
proportion of ethanol in LTF fuels until 2022.37 According to the Renewable Fuel Association,
the new Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) mandate, passed in 2007, will require 36 billion gallons
of renewable and alternative fuels in 2022 with a target of 20 billion gallons for 2015. How
will these incremental changes in the demand for biofuels affect the optimal decision to invest
in the ethanol industry? Even more, how will the RFS mandate affect the optimal investment
decisions for alternative technologies taking into account that a considerable proportion of the
future ethanol production will have to come from cellulose feedstock.38
37From both types of technologies, ethanol derived from corn and ethanol derived from biomass or cellulose.
38Of the total 36 billion gallons, 16 billion gallons will have to come from cellulose feedstock.
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APPENDIX A. Tests for Unit roots
Tests for Unit roots of Y for the baseline case
In order test for the presence of unit root in ln(Y ), we construct the series ln(Y ) of this
variable following Odening et al. (2007). Given the functional form of R equation (2) and the
specific demand for ethanol and supply equation (3), we obtain Yt as:
Yt = Rot/Rˆt(qt) (A.1)
where the superscript o refers to the observed values in monthly data for the period 1995 -
2008. All prices were deflated using PPI with base 2007. Also, data on prices and production of
ethanol were seasonally adjusted. The parameters values for the demand and supply function
as well as the ones of equation (1) can be seen in the calibration section.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root:
Regression Test Statistic Critical values
1% 5% 10%
lnYt − lnYt−1 = ρ lnYt−1 -2.181 -3.490 -2.886 -2.576
Phillips - Perron test for unit root:
Regression Test Statistic Critical values
1% 5% 10%
lnYt − lnYt−1 = ρ lnYt−1 -1.840 -3.490 -2.886 -2.576
Data source of prices:
• Ethanol price: Renewable Fuel News (weekly news): average of US ethanol price.
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• DDG price: USDA.
• Corn price: USDA.
• Ethanol production: USDA.
Tests for Unit roots of non-linear shocks
Let Rot and n
o
t the observed values at period t, then the observed value of the shock, Y
o
t ,
can be recovered as a non linear function of equation (29):
Rot = Rˆ(n
o
t , Y
o
t ) = D(n
o
t , Y
o
t )−XcSc(not , Y ot ) + Y ot γ0xDDG, (A.2)
where D(not , Y
o
t ) and Sc(n
o
t , Y
o
t ) are given by equation (30). The test for unit roots does not
reject the null hypothesis.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root:
Regression Test Statistic Critical values
1% 5% 10%
lnYt − lnYt−1 = ρ lnYt−1 -1.039 -3.490 -2.886 -2.576
Phillips - Perron test for unit root:
Regression Test Statistic Critical values
1% 5% 10%
lnYt − lnYt−1 = ρ lnYt−1 -0.992 -3.490 -2.886 -2.576
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Table 1 Model Calibration: Parameters and Steady-State Value of Key
Variables (Annual Frequency)
Preferences Technology Fiscal Policy Key Variables
β 0.96 δss 0.10 τ c 0.12 k 2.13
η 10.11 A 1.85 τ I 0.06 ey 1
φ 1.58 δ0 0.27 τ e 0.49 eh 0.88
ω 1.91 δ1 1.62 g1 0.12 qh 0.6
ν0 0.14 g2 0.02 h 0.3
ν1 0.26 bg 0.15 pe 0.0276
µ 0.36 qh 0.96 pk 1
c 0.63
bh 0.41
y 1
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Table 2 Developed Countries - Model Calibration: Parameters and
Steady-State Value of Key Variables (Annual Frequency)
Preferences Technology Fiscal
Policy
Key Vari-
ables
β 0.98 δss 0.10 τ c 0.13 k 2.53
η 10.11 A 1.71 τ I 0.11 ey 0.5
φ 0.0036 δ0 0.17 τ e 1.41 eh 0.44
ω 2.03 δ1 1.25 g1 0.19 ri 0.98
ν0 0.24 g2 -0.01 h 0.3
ν1 0.98 bg 0.61 pe 0.025
µ 0.36 ri 0.022 c 0.56
α 0.35 bi 1.20
y 1
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Table 3 Developing Countries - Model Calibration: Parameters and
Steady-State Value of Key Variables (Annual Frequency)
Preferences Technology Fiscal
Policy
Key Vari-
ables
β 0.97 δss 0.10 τ c 0.10 k 2.22
η 10.11 A 1.79 τ I 0.06 ey 0.95
φ 0.22 δ0 0.20 τ e 0.77 eh 0.84
ω 1.71 δ1 1.42 g1 0.15 qi 0.97
ν0 0.40 g2 -0.02 h 0.3
ν1 0.78 bg 0.53 pe 0.025
µ 0.36 ri 0.035 c 0.72
α 0.35 bi 3.99
y 1
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Table 4 Incomplete Markets and Developed Countries - statistical Mo-
ments
Variable (x) Std dev % Corr(pe, x) Autocorr
Oil-tax rate (τ e) 1.214 -0.997 0.721
GDP (y) 0.061 -0.993 0.709
Consumption non-energy goods (c) 0.049 -0.909 0.865
Use of Oil in production (ey) 0.116 -0.993 0.771
Utilization of capital (u) 0.103 -0.758 0.655
Capital (k) 0.089 -0.586 0.983
Public Debt / GDP (bg/GDP ) 0.068 0.998 0.748
International bonds / GDP (bi/GDP ) 0.068 0.958 0.691
Table 5 Incomplete Markets and Developing Countries - statistical Mo-
ments
Variable (x) Std dev % Corr(pe, x) Autocorr
Oil-tax rate (τ e) 1.142 -0.995 0.757
GDP (y) 0.074 -0.994 0.716
Consumption non-energy goods (c) 0.070 -0.898 0.877
Use of Oil in production (ey) 0.136 -0.942 0.860
Utilization of capital (u) 0.116 -0.655 0.597
Capital (k) 0.134 -0.697 0.970
Public Debt / GDP (bg/GDP ) 0.064 0.982 0.674
International bonds / GDP (bi/GDP ) 0.082 0.982 0.701
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Table 6 Complete vs Incomplete Markets and Developed Countries - sta-
tistical Moments
Complete markets Incomplete markets
Variable (x) Std dev % Corr(pe, x) Autocorr Std dev % Corr(pe, x) Autocorr
τ e 1.299 -0.999 0.730 1.214 -0.997 0.721
(1 + τ e)pe 0.713 0.999 0.739 0.764 0.998 0.747
GDP 0.056 -0.988 0.697 0.061 -0.993 0.709
c/eh 0.064 0.999 0.739 0.069 0.998 0.747
Primary surp 0.179 -0.961 0.804 0.109 -0.301 0.929
bg/GDP 0.043 0.992 0.688 0.068 0.998 0.748
bi/GDP 0.063 0.944 0.681 0.068 0.958 0.691
Table 7 Complete vs Incomplete Markets and Developing Countries - sta-
tistical Moments
Complete markets Incomplete markets
Variable (x) Std dev % Corr(pe, x) Autocorr Std dev % Corr(pe, x) Autocorr
τ e 1.180 -0.995 0.757 1.142 -0.995 0.757
(1 + τ e)pe 0.961 0.999 0.722 0.978 0.999 0.722
GDP 0.072 -0.994 0.715 0.074 -0.994 0.716
c/eh 0.086 0.999 0.722 0.088 0.999 0.722
Primary surp 0.167 0.283 0.217 0.192 0.982 0.213
bg/GDP 0.055 0.973 0.655 0.064 0.982 0.674
bi/GDP 0.080 0.980 0.700 0.082 0.982 0.701
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Table 8 Sensitivity analysis - κ2 = 0.0008 - statistical Moments
Variable (x) Std dev % Corr(pe, x) Autocorr
Oil-tax rate (τ e) 1.331 -0.996 0.746
GDP (y) 0.070 -0.967 0.769
Consumption non-energy goods (c) 0.035 -0.884 0.836
Use of Oil in production (ey) 0.120 -0.994 0.782
Utilization of capital (u) 0.088 -0.867 0.509
Capital (k) 0.063 -0.880 0.929
Public Debt / GDP (bg/GDP ) 0.181 0.568 0.961
International bonds / GDP (bi/GDP ) 0.432 0.101 0.982
Table 9 Sensitivity analysis - τ I = 0.056 - statistical Moments
Variable (x) Std dev % Corr(pe, x) Autocorr
Oil-tax rate (τ e) 1.226 -0.999 0.731
GDP (y) 0.056 -0.987 0.695
Consumption non-energy goods (c) 0.047 -0.922 0.856
Use of Oil in production (ey) 0.106 -0.996 0.761
Utilization of capital (u) 0.095 -0.750 0.642
Capital (k) 0.080 -0.607 0.981
Public Debt / GDP (bg/GDP ) 0.054 0.987 0.675
International bonds / GDP (bi/GDP ) 0.064 0.937 0.678
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Table 10 Sensitivity analysis - τ e = 0.77 - statistical Moments
Variable (x) Std dev % Corr(pe, x) Autocorr
Oil-tax rate (τ e) 1.096 -0.994 0.721
GDP (y) 0.055 -0.992 0.708
Consumption non-energy goods (c) 0.047 -0.914 0.863
Use of Oil in production (ey) 0.106 -0.992 0.774
Utilization of capital (u) 0.092 -0.770 0.643
Capital (k) 0.079 -0.605 0.981
Public Debt / GDP (bg/GDP ) 0.059 0.998 0.731
International bonds / GDP (bi/GDP ) 0.065 0.944 0.687
Table 11 Sensitivity analysis - ν1 = 0.78 - statistical Moments
Variable (x) Std dev % Corr(pe, x) Autocorr
Oil-tax rate (τ e) 1.216 -0.999 0.747
GDP (y) 0.051 -0.984 0.687
Consumption non-energy goods (c) 0.044 -0.913 0.857
Use of Oil in production (ey) 0.086 -0.964 0.820
Utilization of capital (u) 0.088 -0.645 0.653
Capital (k) 0.085 -0.615 0.980
Public Debt / GDP (bg/GDP ) 0.047 0.983 0.658
International bonds / GDP (bi/GDP ) 0.064 0.945 0.681
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Table 12 Operating Costs - C0
Concept(1) x*P(2)
Water (gal) (plus treatment) 0.0344
KwH Electricity 0.0477
Natural Gas (btu* bushel*alcohol yield) 0.3017
Enzymes 0.0593
Yeasts 0.0272
Chemicals: processing and antibiotics 0.0247
Chemicals: boiling and cooling 0.0062
Denaturants 0.0433
Waste management 0.0206
Maintenance 0.0143
Transportation (rail only - ethanol) 0.1834
All other unspecified 0.0870
Labor 0.0319
Management 0.0064
Indirect taxes 0.0234
Total operative costs 0.9116
Notes: (1) not included corn and return to investors
(2) input requirement per ethanol gallon times input price
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Table 13 Baseline Case: threshold values of Yn and R(n)
N Y En Y
e
n R
E(n) Re(n)
10 0.65 0.16 1.44 0.35
20 0.69 0.17 1.44 0.35
30 0.75 0.18 1.44 0.35
40 0.81 0.20 1.44 0.35
50 0.88 0.22 1.44 0.35
60 0.97 0.24 1.44 0.35
70 1.08 0.26 1.44 0.35
80 1.21 0.30 1.44 0.35
90 1.38 0.34 1.44 0.35
100 1.61 0.39 1.44 0.35
110 1.93 0.47 1.44 0.35
Table 14 Sensitivity Analysis: Variable operating costs: Yn and R(n)
N Y En Y
e
n R
E(n) Re(n)
10 0.58 0.13 1.31 0.30
20 0.63 0.15 1.32 0.31
30 0.69 0.16 1.34 0.31
40 0.76 0.18 1.36 0.32
50 0.84 0.20 1.38 0.33
60 0.94 0.22 1.40 0.34
70 1.06 0.26 1.42 0.34
80 1.20 0.29 1.44 0.35
90 1.39 0.34 1.45 0.36
100 1.64 0.41 1.47 0.36
110 1.99 0.50 1.49 0.37
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Table 15 Sensitivity Analysis: Variable entry / exit costs: Yn and R(n)
N Y En Y
e
n R
E(n) Re(n)
10 0.56 0.14 1.26 0.31
20 0.61 0.15 1.28 0.31
30 0.68 0.17 1.31 0.32
40 0.74 0.18 1.33 0.33
50 0.83 0.20 1.36 0.33
60 0.93 0.23 1.38 0.34
70 1.05 0.26 1.41 0.34
80 1.20 0.29 1.43 0.35
90 1.39 0.34 1.46 0.36
100 1.65 0.40 1.48 0.36
110 2.01 0.49 1.51 0.37
Table 16 Sensitivity Analysis: Constant elasticity functions: Yn and R(n)
N Y En Y
e
n R
E(n) Re(n)
10 0.03 0.01 1.67 0.37
20 0.09 0.02 1.67 0.37
30 0.18 0.04 1.67 0.37
40 0.30 0.07 1.67 0.37
50 0.46 0.10 1.67 0.37
60 0.66 0.15 1.67 0.37
70 0.92 0.21 1.67 0.37
80 1.27 0.29 1.67 0.37
90 1.76 0.39 1.67 0.37
100 2.45 0.55 1.67 0.37
110 3.58 0.80 1.67 0.37
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Table 17 Sensitivity Analysis: changing nss: Yn and R(n)
N Y En Y
e
n R
E(n) Re(n)
10 0.67 0.16 1.52 0.37
20 0.71 0.17 1.52 0.37
30 0.75 0.18 1.52 0.37
40 0.80 0.19 1.52 0.37
50 0.86 0.21 1.52 0.37
60 0.92 0.22 1.52 0.37
70 0.99 0.24 1.52 0.37
80 1.07 0.26 1.52 0.37
90 1.17 0.28 1.52 0.37
100 1.29 0.31 1.52 0.37
110 1.44 0.35 1.52 0.37
Table 18 Sensitivity Analysis: Elasticity demand for ethanol - 1st exercise
Function Linear Constant elasticity
N Y En Y
e
n Y
E
n Y
e
n
10 0.16 0.09 0.44 0.26
20 0.29 0.17 0.48 0.29
30 0.43 0.25 0.53 0.32
40 0.57 0.33 0.59 0.35
50 0.72 0.41 0.67 0.40
60 0.89 0.51 0.78 0.46
70 1.07 0.61 0.92 0.55
80 1.28 0.73 1.13 0.67
90 1.51 0.86 1.45 0.86
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Table 19 Sensitivity Analysis: Non-linear shocks:
N Y En Y
e
n R
E(n) Re(n)
10 15.28 6.22 1.22 0.46
20 24.53 11.27 1.22 0.46
30 30.38 15.11 1.22 0.46
40 35.47 18.15 1.22 0.46
50 39.14 20.65 1.22 0.46
60 42.14 22.76 1.22 0.46
70 44.66 24.58 1.22 0.46
80 46.84 26.17 1.22 0.46
90 48.74 27.59 1.22 0.46
100 50.42 28.86 1.22 0.46
110 51.93 30.02 1.22 0.46
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Figure 1 Cross Country Responses of Growth Rates to Oil Shocks; Annual
data for the period 1960-2007
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Notes: The plots show the responses of GDP growth rates, mea-
sured in percentages, to the Choleski, one-standard deviation in-
novation in α, where α ≡ log(Oil Pricet) − log(Oil Pricet−1). Oil
prices are measured in real terms and the source of data for the
growth rates is the World Bank.
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Figure 2 Sources of Fluctuations in the Model
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Notes: Cycles computed with HP filter and smoothing parameter
λ = 6.25. For each source of dynamics, the dashed lines indicate
the steady-state level of the corresponding variables.
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Figure 3 Data and Model GDP’s
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(b) Cycles of GDP, Data and Model
Notes: Cycles computed with HP filter and smoothing parameter
λ = 6.25. By design, the data and model GDP cycles coincide.
Dashed lines indicate the steady-state level of the corresponding
variables.
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Figure 4 One-Time Shock to Oil in the Competitive Equilibrium without
Persistence
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Figure 5 One-Time Shock to Oil in the Competitive Equilibrium with Per-
sistence
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Figure 6 Oil Tax Policies and Model Dynamics
 0.02
 0.025
 0.03
 0.035
 0.04
 0.045
 0.05
 0.055
 0.06
 2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18
Gross Oil Price
Competitive Equilibrium
Ramsey Problem
Full Stabilization
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 1.2
 1.4
 1.6
 1.8
 2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18
Tax Rate on Oil
 0.99
 0.995
 1
 1.005
 1.01
 1.015
 1.02
 2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18
GDP
 0.622
 0.624
 0.626
 0.628
 0.63
 0.632
 0.634
 0.636
 0.638
 0.64
 0.642
 0.644
 2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18
Consumption of Non-Energy Goods
 0.99
 0.995
 1
 1.005
 1.01
 1.015
 1.02
 1.025
 2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18
Use of Oil in Production
 2.11
 2.12
 2.13
 2.14
 2.15
 2.16
 2.17
 2.18
 2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18
Beginning-of-period Capital
 0.11
 0.115
 0.12
 0.125
 0.13
 0.135
 0.14
 0.145
 0.15
 0.155
 0.16
 0.165
 2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18
Public Debt
 0.35
 0.36
 0.37
 0.38
 0.39
 0.4
 0.41
 0.42
 0.43
 0.44
 0.45
 2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18
Household International Assets
Notes: The top-left pane shows the gross price of oil pet (1 + τ
e
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behave in each case.
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Figure 7 IRFs Ramsey Problem under Incomplete Markets - Developed
and Developing Countries
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Figure 8 IRFs Ramsey Problem for Incomplete vs Complete Markets -
Developed Countries
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Figure 9 IRFs Ramsey Problem for Incomplete vs Complete Markets -
Developing Countries
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Figure 10 IRFs Sensitivity Analysis - κ2
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Figure 11 IRFs Sensitivity Analysis - τ I
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Figure 12 IRFs Sensitivity Analysis - τ e
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Figure 13 IRFs Sensitivity Analysis - ν1
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Figure 14 Baseline case: threshold values of Yn and R(n)
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Figure 15 Rt annual average vs RE(n) and Re(n)
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Figure 16 Extra Rents
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Figure 17 Sensitivity Analysis: Variable operative costs
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Figure 18 Sensitivity Analysis: Variable entry / exit costs
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Figure 19 Sensitivity Analysis: Constant elasticity functions
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Figure 20 Sensitivity Analysis: Changing nss
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Threshold Values of Shock Y
n
Y
 
 
YE
n
Ye
n
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Threshold Values of Gross Marging R
n
R
 
 
Initial n = 105
Baseline Case
Notes: Dashed lines are for REn and continuous lines are for R
e
n.
112
Figure 21 Sensitivity Analysis: elasticity of demand for ethanol - 1st exer-
cise
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Figure 22 Static comparative - elasticity of demand for ethanol
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Figure 23 Sensitivity Analysis: elasticity of demand for ethanol - 2st exer-
cise
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